Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: A Coup-Proofing Paradox

Abstract

It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being plagued with rebellion. Scholarship has argued the practice of coup-proofing is potentially responsible for this trend. However, though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, states often retain substantial capabilities in the form of well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing units. This article argues that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are hesitant to deploy their coup-proofing units: when coup risk is high. Using a global sample of authoritarian regimes for the years 1971–2011, tests indicate that heavily coup-proofed regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high but see no change in conflict propensity when coup risk is low.

Jumping on the Bandwagon: Differentiation and Security Defection during Conflict

“…Therefore, second, I interact the differentiation index with a measure of structural coup risk (Dworschak 2019; Powell 2019). The coup risk index by Belkin and Schofer (2003) captures the underlying propensity of a coup d’état happening (see also Belkin and Schofer 2005; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2016).…”

The Quran and the Sword

“…As noticed by the literature (Geddes 2009;Powell 2019;Quinlivan 1999;Lutterbeck 2021), coup-proofing also involves costs. Given the lack of coordination capacity, the army may be less effective at internal repression.…”

State breakdown and Army-Splinter Rebellions

“…Factionalized political systems may struggle to deal with insurgencies (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Armies weakened by coup-proofing may be little able to deal with rebellions from below on the battlefield, encouraging them to rebel, particularly at moments of high coup risk when leaders have incentives to hold elite coup-proofing forces back in the capital (Powell 2019). However, I expect the relationship between personalism and ASRs to be stronger than with non-military rebellions.…”

“…In other words, coup-proofing can channel opposition to a regime into other types of threats. Recent scholarship, drawing together different issue areas in civil-military relations (Brooks 2019) has developed a tradeoff between coups and civil wars (Powell 2014; 2019; Houle 2016; Roessler 2016; Sudduth 2016) based on the pivotal position of the armed forces. I confirm this logic and show that army-splinter wars are an important and under-explored form by which rebellions can occur, when a faction of soldiers has the motivation to rebel but not the opportunity to launch a coup.…”