The Quran and the Sword

Abstract

This paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially stage a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants to co-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains where the loyalty of the autocrat’s army is strong while the organizational strength of religious movements is rather low. Radical institutional reforms can then be implemented. Empirically, the dominant regime in contemporary Muslim countries is the regime of double co-option where the autocrat resorts to a double-edged tactic: pleasing the official clerics by slowing the pace of reforms, and ensuring the loyalty of the military so as to put down clerics-led rebellions.

Institutional Challenges at the Early Stages of Development

“…For example, in the case of Pakistan, Martin (2016) has observed a tendency among traditional landlords to oppose the (secular) education of their dependents lest they should seek emancipation and develop 'unrealistic expectations, and thereby cause a shortage of cheap agricultural labour (p. 87). Also, assuming a regime of autocracy, Auriol andPlatteau (2017a, 2017b) have shown that a ruler may deliberately sacrifice institutional reforms in order to placate the opposition coming from traditional leaders (including religious authorities) who resent that their erstwhile prerogatives will be encroached upon (see also Auriol et al (2021), where the army is added as a strategic actor). This raises the serious issue of how a modern state can manage the divergent interests of popular masses under the influence of traditional authorities that want to preserve the old order based on the community, on the one hand, and urban elites that have been exposed to Western values centred upon the improvement of the individual, on the other hand.…”

“…In reality, the political game is more complex than what has been suggested above. As theorised by Auriol, Platteau, and Verdier (2021), and explained in Chapter 1, the political game played out in countries where radical religious movements are present is a triangular game between the ruler, the military, and religious clerics. An important implication of this more complete perspective is that in order to stabilise his power and avoid a state coup, a ruler may choose to reduce the strength of the military and simultaneously co-opt religious leaders.…”

Failed Secular Revolutions: Religious Belief, Competition, and Extremism

“…All advanced economies have gone through a secular transition marked by the drastic reduction of the power and privilege of the clerical elite, the institutional importance of religion, and demands for religious sacrifice by the population (Rubin, 2017;Auriol et al, 2022). There are, however, numerous examples of failed secular revolutions in which a backlash has occurred and the religious organizations have ended up with greater political power (Auriol & Platteau, 2017).…”

“…This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, there is a growing literature in economics on co-optation of religious authorities (Rubin, 2017;Auriol & Platteau, 2017;Auriol et al, 2022). In particular, Auriol and Platteau (2017) show how secular reforms can be blocked by conservative clerics and how the risk of this occurring is greater in decentralized religions.…”

Devolution under autocracy: evidence from Pakistan

“…Studying the Pakistani experience can therefore provide important insights for the understanding of authoritarianism in the context of electoral politics. Situating our analysis in the emerging literature on politics under authoritarianism, we argue that local government elections held by Pakistan's respective military regimes provided important instances of authoritarian power-sharing through which military rulers co-opted elites by distributing the benefits of 'joint rule' (Svolik 2012;Auriol et al 2023). More precisely, we adduce quantitative evidence to the effect that the rise of General Zia to supreme power was associated with a clear strengthening of political dynasties, and we highlight the mechanism that plausibly lies behind this relationship.…”