Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board

Brickley, James A.; Coles, Jeffrey L.; Jarrell, Gregg A.

doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(96)00013-2

Cited by 1,239 publications

(815 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Gul and Leung (2004) suggest that business leaders who also serve as a chairman of the board could reduce the board's ability to exercise effective control over the management and thus negatively affect the strategic choices. Brickley et al (1997) confirm that there are also agency costs coupled with having two persons holding the titles of chairman and CEO. They find no evidence for companies with separate occupations have better outcomes than those who have the same person holding both the two functions.…”

Section: The Ceo Duality and Diversificationmentioning

confidence: 71%

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Marouan¹

2015

IJBM

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of the board of directors and the management entrenchment in the explanation of diversification strategy of the Tunisian firms. In particular we focus on the characteristics of these two opposite directions bodies where the first controls the second in explaining the strategic choices of the firm. We find evidence for the negative effect of the board size and outside directors on the diversification strategy of the firm. The empirical result points also the negative effect of the CEO duality, which is inconsistent with the agency hypothesis.

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Section: The Ceo Duality and Diversificationmentioning

confidence: 71%

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Marouan¹

2015

IJBM

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“…This is opposed to the agency theoretic view (Weisbach 1988) that CEO duality may lead to entrenchment of CEO power that will lead to reduced oversight and create incentives for self-serving actions at the expense of shareholder value. Empirical evidence on CEO duality has been decidedly mixed with respect to non-financial companies, with some studies finding a positive relation (Brickley et al 1997;Peng et al 2007) while other studies documenting an insignificant or negative relationship (Larcker et al 2011;Rechner and Dalton 1991). The evidence with regard to banks is also reportedly mixed; while some studies (Pi and Timme 1993;Pathan 2009) finding a positive relationship between CEO duality and bank performance, while others such as Mishra and Nielsen (2000) and Liang et al (2013), finding a negative or insignificant relationship between the two.…”

Section: Variables Of Interest: Board Characteristics and Ownership Dmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bank Ownership, Board Characteristics and Performance: Evidence from Commercial Banks in India

Sarkar

2018

IJFS

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Abstract:We study the effect of board governance in state-owned and private banks by undertaking a study of commercial banks in India that has both bank groups. Covering a ten-year period from 2003 to 2012 that witnessed a large number of governance reforms in India, the results of our empirical analysis provide evidence of strong ownership effects with board independence exhibiting a significant positive correlation with the performance of private banks and a significant but negative correlation with the performance of state-owned banks. The effect of CEO duality is negative in state-owned banks where incidence of CEO duality is high. We find that a longer CEO tenure has significant positive effects on bank outcomes with these effects strengthening in the later years of CEO tenure. Our results have governance implications for strengthening the composition of board of directors and CEO tenure especially in state-owned banks.

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“…CEO participation in board discussions and decision-making can facilitate effective communication and motivate CEOs (e.g., Brickley at al., 1997;Muth and Donaldson, 1998), but may also be associated with significant agency problems (e.g., Bebchuck and Fried, 2004;Fama and Jensen, 1983). Apparently persuaded by the latter view, the NZX Best Practice Code recommends that the CEO should not fill the role of board chair, nor sit on the audit committee.…”

Section: Ceo Involvementmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Zealand Corporate Boards in Transition: Composition, Activity and Incentives between 1995 and 2010

Boyle

Ji²

2012

SSRN Journal

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We document, describe and interpret changes in New Zealand corporate board characteristics between 1995 and 2010, a period centred around the 2003 introduction of the NZX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code. Unsurprisingly, the representation of non-executive, independent and female directors on NZ boards rose during the period, as did real chair and director fees and the importance of board committees, while average board size fell. Perhaps more surprisingly, much of this movement occurred before 2003. However, the magnitude of these changes frequently varies according to firm size, and there are some intriguing differences between New Zealand board characteristics and those prevailing in other, larger, countries. We use this information to identify a number of unanswered questions about New Zealand corporate boards.JEL classification: G34, G38

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Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board

Cited by 1,239 publications

References 25 publications

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Corporate Board Characteristics, Managerial Entrenchment and Diversification Strategy: Evidence from Tunisian Context

Bank Ownership, Board Characteristics and Performance: Evidence from Commercial Banks in India

New Zealand Corporate Boards in Transition: Composition, Activity and Incentives between 1995 and 2010

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