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Motivated by psychology research showing that individual mood is affected by weather and daylight savings changes respectively, Saunders (American Economic Review 83, 1337-1345, 1993) and Kamstra et al. (American Economic Review 90, 1005-1011, 2000) find that stock prices are systematically related to these economically-neutral events. Another large psychology literature documents a similarly-strong relationship between sporting team success and fan self-esteem, a finding which raises the possibility that stock prices also respond systematically to sports results, at least in markets where the majority of investors support the same team. However, applying this hypothesis to New Zealand - a small country with a single dominant sport whose primary contests are international in nature - it is found that stock return behaviour is independent of the success of the premier national sports team. Thus, irrational investor responses to sporting contest results are transitory at best.

We document, describe and interpret changes in New Zealand corporate board characteristics between 1995 and 2010, a period centred around the 2003 introduction of the NZX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code. Unsurprisingly, the representation of non-executive, independent and female directors on NZ boards rose during the period, as did real chair and director fees and the importance of board committees, while average board size fell. Perhaps more surprisingly, much of this movement occurred before 2003. However, the magnitude of these changes frequently varies according to firm size, and there are some intriguing differences between New Zealand board characteristics and those prevailing in other, larger, countries. We use this information to identify a number of unanswered questions about New Zealand corporate boards.JEL classification: G34, G38

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We investigate the effectiveness of initiating deposit insurance at the outset of a banking crisis. Using a conjoint analysis approach that allows us to consider the simultaneous impact of multiple deposit insurance attributes and various counterfactuals, we ask a multinational sample of respondents how they would view hypothetical account profiles following the failure of a large competing bank. Previous experience matters: respondents from countries without explicit deposit insurance exhibit greater withdrawal risk, suggesting that the introduction of deposit insurance during a crisis may be only partially successful in preventing bank runs. They also impose a higher deposit interest rate premium. Having a long-term bank relationship reduces withdrawal risk, as does the absence of co-insurance. Keywordsdeposit insurance, banking crises, bank run, conjoint analysis Disciplines Behavioral Economics | FinanceComments NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Financial Intermediation. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Financial Intermediation, [24, 4, (2015) NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Financial Intermediation. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Financial Intermediation, [24, 4, (2015)] doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2015.02.001 THE IMPACT OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE ON DEPOSITOR BEHAVIOR DURING A CRISIS: A CONJOINT ANALYSIS APPROACH AbstractWe investigate the effectiveness of initiating deposit insurance at the outset of a banking crisis.Using a conjoint analysis approach that allows us to consider the simultaneous impact of multiple deposit insurance attributes and various counterfactuals, we ask a multinational sample of respondents how they would view hypothetical account profiles following the failure of a large competing bank. Previous experience matters: respondents from countries without explicit deposit insurance exhibit greater withdrawal risk, suggesting that the introduction of deposit insurance during a crisis may be only partially successful in preventing bank runs. They also impose a higher deposit interest rate premium. Having a long-term bank relationship reduces withdrawal risk, as does the absence of co-insurance.