Learning-Based Jamming Attack against Low-Duty-Cycle Networks

Yang, Zequ; Cheng, Peng; Chen, Jiming

doi:10.1109/tdsc.2015.2501288

Cited by 18 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Recent studies have shown interest on optimizing the EE of jamming attacker [3], [4]. Whereas optimal attacking strategies for hybrid attacker are designed in [5], [6] to achieve maximum degradation in the secrecy rate, however EE aspect has been neglected.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Green Hybrid Attacks in Secure IoT

Ahuja

Mishra

Bose

2020

IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett.

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In pursuance to understand the behavior of a potential green hybrid attacker in secure internet-of-things (IoT), this letter investigates optimal energy utilization from the attacker's viewpoint. Specifically, we propose a novel framework for optimizing the efficacy of a hybrid attacker, possessing capability to both eavesdrop and jam, while considering the underlying energy consumption. In particular, we maximize the attacker energy efficiency (AEE) in secure IoT by deriving the analytical solutions for jointly global-optimal attacking mode, eavesdropping rate, and jamming power. Numerical results, validating analytical claims, reveal that the proposed green design can offer about 45% improvement in average AEE over the relevant benchmarks.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Green Hybrid Attacks in Secure IoT

Ahuja

Mishra

Bose

2020

IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett.

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“…In addition, Namboodiri et al have pointed out how a jammer can temporarily/permanently connect or disconnect AMI messages by spoofing packets [101]. For WSNs, Yang et al [102] proposed a novel attack called "learning-based jamming (LearJam)". The LearJam has two-phase design: (i) learning phase, and (ii) attacking phase.…”

Section: E Denial Of Servicementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Wireless communication networks for the smart metering network are potentially exposed to jamming threats. Several literature pointed out that jamming attacks pose constant DoS threat to smart grid applications [148], [102].…”

Section: Boc Substation Management ----mentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Grid Metering Networks: A Survey on Security, Privacy and Open Research Issues

Kumar

Lin

Bai

et al. 2019

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

260

115

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Smart grid (SG) networks are newly upgraded networks of connected objects that greatly improve reliability, efficiency and sustainability of the traditional energy infrastructure. In this respect, the smart metering infrastructure (SMI) plays an important role in controlling, monitoring and managing multiple domains in the SG. Despite the salient features of SMI, security and privacy issues have been under debate because of the large number of heterogeneous devices that are anticipated to be coordinated through public communication networks. This survey paper shows a brief overview of real cyber attack incidents in traditional energy networks and those targeting the smart metering network. Specifically, we present a threat taxonomy considering: (i) threats in system-level security, (ii) threats and/or theft of services, and (iii) threats to privacy. Based on the presented threats, we derive a set of security and privacy requirements for SG metering networks. Furthermore, we discuss various schemes that have been proposed to address these threats, considering the pros and cons of each. Finally, we investigate the open research issues to shed new light on future research directions in smart grid metering networks.

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“…Researchers have investigated security issues on various kinds of cyber attacks for closed-loop general CPSs. Typical cyber attacks on CPS include Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS) [ 13 , 14 , 15 ], replay attacks [ 16 , 17 ], data injection/integrity attacks [ 18 , 19 ], deception attacks [ 20 ], and so on.…”

Section: Cyber-physical Systems Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A DoS attacker can prevent the communications between physical elements and cyber elements in a CPS. For example, the cyber attacker can jam the wireless communication channel to degrade the packet reception rate [ 13 ]. Zhang et al .…”

Section: Cyber-physical Systems Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on Security and Privacy in Emerging Sensor Networks: From Viewpoint of Close-Loop

Zhang

2016

Sensors

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Nowadays, as the next generation sensor networks, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) refer to the complex networked systems that have both physical subsystems and cyber components, and the information flow between different subsystems and components is across a communication network, which forms a closed-loop. New generation sensor networks are found in a growing number of applications and have received increasing attention from many inter-disciplines. Opportunities and challenges in the design, analysis, verification and validation of sensor networks co-exists, among which security and privacy are two important ingredients. This paper presents a survey on some recent results in the security and privacy aspects of emerging sensor networks from the viewpoint of the closed-loop. This paper also discusses several future research directions under these two umbrellas.

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Learning-Based Jamming Attack against Low-Duty-Cycle Networks

Cited by 18 publications

References 33 publications

Optimal Green Hybrid Attacks in Secure IoT

Optimal Green Hybrid Attacks in Secure IoT

Smart Grid Metering Networks: A Survey on Security, Privacy and Open Research Issues

A Survey on Security and Privacy in Emerging Sensor Networks: From Viewpoint of Close-Loop

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