Learning with error‐based key agreement and authentication scheme for satellite communication

Kumar, Uddeshaya; Garg, Manish

doi:10.1002/sat.1417

Cited by 19 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…We have observed how Kumar and Garg 18 is vulnerable to signal leakage attack. The signal leakage attack is applicable due to (1) NCA server keeps long term private/public key pair in ring learning with errors key exchange environment, and (2) NCA server is using the value

a_{u i}

provided by user (see Figure 2) in the

C_{h} false(. false)

function as input that results

w_{n i} = C_{h} false(K_{n i} false) = C_{h} false(a_{u i} . s false) = C_{h} false(k . s false)

.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although Kumar and Garg 18 has proposed a quantum attack‐resistant protocol (see Figure 2) for satellite communication system, it cannot resist stolen smart card attack using differential power analysis attack described in He et al 19 and Chen and Chen 15 . This is very easy due to low entropy of identity and password; one can find

h false(i d_{i} false| false| p w_{i} false) ⨁ E_{i} = a

from the stored value in the smart card, then find

A_{i} = h false(a false| false| i d_{i} false| false| p w_{i} false)

, then

A_{i} ⨁ C_{i} = B_{i}

, where

C_{i}

can be obtained from card, then opponent checks the validity by

D_{i} = h false(B_{i} false| false| A_{i} false| false| i d_{i} false)

holds or not (refer Chen and Chen 15 ).…”

Section: Motivation and Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To prove the mathematical correctness, we have used lemmas 1,2, and 3 same as in the article of Kumar and Garg 18 . User

u_{i}

authenticates NCA by verifying

b_{n i} = ? b_{n i}^{'}

where

b_{n i} = h false(s k false| false| B_{i} false| false| a_{n i} false| false| k_{n i} false| false| η_{u i} false| false| η_{n i} false)

and

b_{n i}^{'} = h false(s k^{'} false| false| B_{i} false| false| a_{n i} false| false| k_{n i}^{'} false| false| η_{u i} false| false| η_{n i}^{'} false)

.…”

Section: The Proposed Authentication and Key Agreement For Mobile Sat...unclassified

“…The protocol 15 needs

4 t_{p m} + 6 t_{h a} \approx 35.454

operations on user side and

6 t_{h a} + 2 t_{p m} \approx 41.524

operations on NCA side, respectively. Finally the protocol 18 needs

8 t_{h a} + 2 t_{δ} + 4 t_{o m} + t_{a m} + t_{s m} + t_{c h} \approx 2.4830954

operations on user side and

7 t_{h a} + 2 t_{δ} + 4 t_{o m} + t_{a m} + t_{s m} + t_{c h} \approx 0.251606

operations on NCA side, respectively (see Figure 5).…”

Section: Performance Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But these protocols are proposed for both industrial Internet of Things and Internet of Vehicles, respectively. Kumar and Garg 18 have proposed the first post quantum secure authentication protocol for satellite communication system. In this article, we have analyzed Kumar and Garg 18 and tried to improve the existing post quantum secure authentication protocol.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

A post quantum secure construction of an authentication protocol for satellite communication

Dharminder

Dadsena²,

Gupta³

et al. 2022

Satell Commun Network

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Satellite's communication system is used to communicate under significant distance and circumstances where the other communication systems are not comfortable.Since all the data are exchanged over a public channel, so the security of the data is an essential component for the communicating parties. Both key exchange and authentication are two cryptographic tools to establish a secure communication between two parties. Currently, various kinds of authentication protocols are available to establish a secure network, but all of them depend on number-theoretical (discrete logarithm problem/factorization assumption) hard assumptions. Due to Shor's and Grover's computing algorithm number theoretic assumptions are breakable by quantum computers. Although Kumar and Garg have proposed a quantum attack-resistant protocol for satellite communication, it cannot resist stolen smart card attack. We have analyzed that how Kumar and Garg is vulnerable to the stolen smart card attack using differential power analysis attack described in He et al and Chen and Chen. We have also analyzed the modified version of signal leakage attack and sometimes called improved signal leakage attack on Kumar and Garg's protocol.We have tried to construct a secure and efficient authentication protocol for satellites communication that is secure against quantum computing. This is more efficient as it requires only three messages of exchange. This paper includes security proof and performance of the proposed authentication and key agreement protocol.

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a_{u i}

provided by user (see Figure 2) in the

C_{h} false(. false)

function as input that results

w_{n i} = C_{h} false(K_{n i} false) = C_{h} false(a_{u i} . s false) = C_{h} false(k . s false)

.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

h false(i d_{i} false| false| p w_{i} false) ⨁ E_{i} = a

from the stored value in the smart card, then find

A_{i} = h false(a false| false| i d_{i} false| false| p w_{i} false)

, then

A_{i} ⨁ C_{i} = B_{i}

, where

C_{i}

can be obtained from card, then opponent checks the validity by

D_{i} = h false(B_{i} false| false| A_{i} false| false| i d_{i} false)

holds or not (refer Chen and Chen 15 ).…”

Section: Motivation and Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To prove the mathematical correctness, we have used lemmas 1,2, and 3 same as in the article of Kumar and Garg 18 . User

u_{i}

authenticates NCA by verifying

b_{n i} = ? b_{n i}^{'}

where

b_{n i} = h false(s k false| false| B_{i} false| false| a_{n i} false| false| k_{n i} false| false| η_{u i} false| false| η_{n i} false)

and

b_{n i}^{'} = h false(s k^{'} false| false| B_{i} false| false| a_{n i} false| false| k_{n i}^{'} false| false| η_{u i} false| false| η_{n i}^{'} false)

.…”

Section: The Proposed Authentication and Key Agreement For Mobile Sat...unclassified

“…The protocol 15 needs

4 t_{p m} + 6 t_{h a} \approx 35.454

operations on user side and

6 t_{h a} + 2 t_{p m} \approx 41.524

operations on NCA side, respectively. Finally the protocol 18 needs

8 t_{h a} + 2 t_{δ} + 4 t_{o m} + t_{a m} + t_{s m} + t_{c h} \approx 2.4830954

operations on user side and

7 t_{h a} + 2 t_{δ} + 4 t_{o m} + t_{a m} + t_{s m} + t_{c h} \approx 0.251606

operations on NCA side, respectively (see Figure 5).…”

Section: Performance Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

A post quantum secure construction of an authentication protocol for satellite communication

Dharminder

Dadsena²,

Gupta³

et al. 2022

Satell Commun Network

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show abstract

Efficient and quantum‐secure authenticated key exchange scheme for mobile satellite communication networks

Mishra,

Rewal,

Pursharthi

2024

Satell Commun Network

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SummaryThe mobile satellite communication (MSC) system is a vital communication method in which mobile users and network control centers connect via satellites. Since the satellite's communication is wireless, communication security is a critical factor to ensure accountable communication. Key exchange and authentication (KEA) mechanism is widely used to achieve data security for data transmitted in an insecure or open channel. Different authentication systems are suggested in the last many years to establish safe communication, whereas most existing security protocols are based on factorization or discrete logarithm. However, these systems are no longer reliable by Shor's algorithm as any discrete logarithm and factorization can be resolved in polynomial time on quantum computers. Thus, developing a quantum secure KEA protocol for MSC systems is necessary. In this direction, recently a ring learning with an error‐based KEA technique is proposed to ensure a quantum‐safe environment. This scheme is quantum‐safe and satisfies desirable security attributes but has low efficiency in computation and communication. Moreover, establishing a secure session requires six communications among involved entities. As a result, replay attack detection at an early stage is not possible for the central authority (server), which could delay the server response, and the adversary gets the advantage of drawing a denial of service scenario for authorized entities. We propose a lattice‐based KEA protocol for the MSC system to improve computation, communication efficiency, and early‐stage replay attack detection. The security analysis of the proposed scheme is presented in the random oracle model. Calculation of performance is also presented to observe advantages in computation and communication overhead.

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On the security of ring learning with error‐based key exchange protocol against signal leakage attack

Pursharthi

Mishra

2023

Security and Privacy

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Due to the rapid development of mobile communication and hardware technologies, several mobile‐based web applications have gained popularity among mobile users. Mobile users can utilize these devices to access numerous services over the Internet. To ensure secure communication, different key exchange and authentication (KEA) protocols are proposed and frequently used. However, due to the advent of quantum computers, numerous quantum‐safe KEA protocols are also developed using various complex mathematical problems in ideal lattices. As it is an emerging and developing area, we analyze the security of recently suggested ring learning with error based KEA protocols. The goal of this study is to gain a comprehensive understanding of quantum‐safe KEA mechanisms. For our study, we have considered Dharminder's LWE‐based KEA mechanism and Dharminder and Chandran's LWE‐based KEA mechanism. These protocols enable effective communication and provide a better means for safely transmitting messages between user and server. However, we have discovered that a fundamental security weakness in these methods makes them vulnerable to signal leakage attacks (SLA). Based on our analysis, we demonstrated security weakness against SLA and provide the road‐map for secure construction.

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Learning with error‐based key agreement and authentication scheme for satellite communication

Cited by 19 publications

References 21 publications

A post quantum secure construction of an authentication protocol for satellite communication

A post quantum secure construction of an authentication protocol for satellite communication

Efficient and quantum‐secure authenticated key exchange scheme for mobile satellite communication networks

On the security of ring learning with error‐based key exchange protocol against signal leakage attack

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