Lectures on the philosophy of the human mind.

Brown, Thomas

doi:10.1037/11842-000

Cited by 47 publications

(31 citation statements)

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“…The Law of Recency refers to the observation that memories of recent experiences come to mind more easily than memories from the distant past (T. Brown, 1824; Calkins, 1896). Given the ubiquitous nature of recency across time-scales, memory tasks, and stimulus materials, it is not surprising that it has occupied center stage in theoretical analyses of memory over many decades (Crowder, 1976).…”

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confidence: 99%

A context-based theory of recency and contiguity in free recall.

Sederberg¹,

Howard²,

Kahana³

2008

Psychological Review

348

522

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We present a new model of free recall based on Howard and Kahana's (2002) temporal context model and Usher and McClelland's (2001) leaky-accumulator decision model. In this model, contextual drift gives rise to both short-term and long-term recency effects, and contextual retrieval gives rise to short-term and long-term contiguity effects, Recall decisions are controlled by a race between competitive leaky-accumulators. The model captures the dynamics of immediate, delayed, and continual distractor free recall, demonstrating that dissociations between short-and long-term recency can naturally arise from a model that uses an internal contextual state as the sole cue for retrieval across time scales.The Law of Recency refers to the observation that memories of recent experiences come to mind more easily than memories from the distant past (T. Brown, 1824;Calkins, 1896). Given the ubiquitous nature of recency across time-scales, memory tasks, and stimulus materials, it is not surprising that it has occupied center stage in theoretical analyses of memory over many decades (Crowder, 1976).Whereas some students of memory have sought a common cause for the varied manifestations of recency (Crowder, 1982;Greene, 1986) others have posited distinct mechanisms for the recency effects observed at short and at long time scales (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). In support of a dual-store explanation of recency, Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkeriazi, Haarmann, and Usher (2005) identified several striking differences between the recency effects observed in immediate free recall and continual distractor free recall. In immediate free recall, participants are asked to recall the list items, in any order, immediately following the last item presentation. In continual distractor free recall, participants are given a demanding distractor task following each list item. After the last period of distraction they are asked to recall the items in any order (see Figure 1 for a graphical description of the free recall tasks). Davelaar et al. (2005) suggest that the existence of dissociations between short-and long-term recency calls into question models that hypothesize a general forgetting process underlying recency phenomena observed at different time scales. One popular class of general forgetting models assumes that a time-varying internal context signal gives rise to recency in both shortterm and long-term recall tasks (see Kahana, Howard, & Polyn, 2008, for a review). Davelaar et al. (2005) instead propose a model of free recall in which an activation-based short-term store (STS) produces recency in immediate free recall, and a time-varying context signal Correspondence concerning this article may be addressed to Per B. Sederberg (persed@princeton.edu). NIH Public Access NIH-PA Author ManuscriptNIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript produces long-term recency via a weight-based long-term store (LTS) in continual distractor free recall.We next review some of the major empirical phenomena observed in free recall and t...

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confidence: 99%

A context-based theory of recency and contiguity in free recall.

Sederberg¹,

Howard²,

Kahana³

2008

Psychological Review

348

522

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“…The universality and objectivity of morality was justified, on this model, as on Hutcheson's, by the identical constitution of all human minds, which revealed the intentions of the Deity. 31 A secularised version of this same idea was to be found in Charles Darwin's moral thought. In one of his early private notebooks, Darwin had already invoked common descent as an idea that could shed a whole new light on the moral economy: "Our descent, then, is the origin of our evil passions!!…”

Section: IIImentioning

confidence: 84%

“…Brown himself acknowledged that in creating a new category to replace what had previously been considered as various "active powers of the mind", he had "formed one great comprehensive class of our emotions". 23 Writing several decades later, the Scottish philosophical psychologist Alexander Bain also made clear the huge expanse of psychic territory that was being annexed under the new flag: "Emotion is the name here used to comprehend all that is understood by feelings, states of feeling, pleasures, pains, passions, sentiments, affections." 24 While passions and affections had been generally defined as movements of the soul (specifically of the will and, in some cases, of the intellect too), the emotions were, from the outset, understood as basic mental feelings independent of any powers or faculties of the soul, which now disappeared.…”

Section: Thomas Dixonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revolting Passions

Dixon¹

2011

Modern Theology

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Whatever happened to the passions? The pathe, passiones, or passions of the soul were a major mental category for thinkers from the ancient Greeks to the early moderns, until the "emotions" came into existence in the nineteenth century. The new science of psychology took over many ancient categories wholesale. The senses and the intellect, the memory and the will were all preserved. But the passions and affections-although they persisted, and persist to this day, in some contexts-were never studied by the exponents of evolution and neuroscience. Instead they were displaced by the "emotions", whose place as a psychological category was cemented through its adoption by eminent scientific figures including Charles Darwin and William James. 1 The predominant scholarly attitude towards the emotions in recent decades has been one of loving restoration. Long maligned by moralists and theologians as irrational and harmful, so the story goes, it has fallen to modern philosophers, neuroscientists and psychologists in recent years to retrieve the emotions from centuries of neglect and abuse and to restore their intellectual lustre. The standard view now is that emotions are cognitive states which constitute intelligent appraisals of the world. They are neither mere feelings, nor obstacles to reason. The cognitive nature of emotions is used to argue not only against a strong dichotomy between reason and emotion, but also in favour of the relevance of our emotions to ethical decisions. Our pro-emotional revisionism has also extended to rereading canonical works in the history of ideas in search of precursors for the modern orthodoxy about the close interconnection between thinking and feeling.There is a danger that this modern surge of approval for the emotions will obscure our view of the real nature of both secular and religious traditions of thought about these subjects. Looking carefully at the history of our categories can alert us to important differences between a mental typology

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“…Then, we used a search task to provide participants with a goal that they eventually completed (finding when a picture of a pair of eyeglasses was followed immediately by a picture of scissors). By manipulating participants’ adoption of a goal, their pursuit of the goal, and their completion of the goal, we controlled the participants’ activation history (e.g., recency and frequency; Brown, 1820; Thorndike, 1914). We measured how the accessibility of the target concept, eyeglasses, changed after goal completion in the search task by administering lexical decision tasks (LDTs) at different delays after the completion.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What remains on your mind after you are done?: Flexible regulation of knowledge accessibility

Hedberg

Higgins

2011

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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The accessibility of stored knowledge has been found to decline over time after activation without further stimulation. A special case is goal pursuit; goal-related knowledge remains accessible until goal completion, and then its accessibility declines rapidly. We hypothesized that after goal completion the decline in accessibility of goal-related knowledge would be especially rapid for strong promotion-focused individuals because their motivation to eagerly advance beyond the status quo would make accessibility of this knowledge an irrelevant detriment. We hypothesized an opposite effect for strongly prevention-predominant individuals because their motivation to vigilantly maintain a satisfactory state would make accessibility of this knowledge continually relevant. The results of two studies supported both these predicted moderators of accessibility change. Indeed, we found that for strongly prevention-predominant participants, knowledge accessibility actually increased over time after goal completion. We discuss how even basic cognitive mechanisms, like changes in accessibility, can be affected by general motivational concerns.

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Lectures on the philosophy of the human mind.

Cited by 47 publications

References 0 publications

A context-based theory of recency and contiguity in free recall.

A context-based theory of recency and contiguity in free recall.

Revolting Passions

What remains on your mind after you are done?: Flexible regulation of knowledge accessibility

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