Legal Fees, Cost-Shifting Rules and Litigation: Experimental Evidence

Gabuthy, Yannick; Peterlé, Emmanuel; Tisserand, Jean-Christian

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2021.101705

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Whatever the case, the court fee has always the same goal: to reconcile the social and private incentives to litigate (Tahura, 2021a). By the same token, Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno (2020), Gabuthy, Peterle, and Tisserand (2021), and Massenot, Maraki, and Thöni, 2021) conducted an experiment in order to explore how the legal fee arrangement (i.e. flat or contingent fees) and the trial costs allocation rule (i.e.…”

Section: The Judicial Budget and Court Feementioning

confidence: 99%

Socioeconomic and legal analysis of court fees structure and payment system in Ethiopia: Towards a policy-oriented approach

Mengistie

2022

JSeD

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Court fees in Ethiopia are governed by the Court Fees Regulation Number 177/1945. Although many things have changed over the past 67 years, none of the consecutive governments attempted to revise the court fee system. The user charge on judicial litigation (court fees), is justified for the existence of negative externalities that each user (litigant) generates to society. This is generated by the existence of incomplete markets, where the private benefits of litigation differ from social benefits. The charge has to match both benefits (private and social) and reach a social optimal equilibrium. The argument is that when private litigation costs are less than the social costs, there will be an inefficiently high level of litigation. Methodologically, a total of 44 legal professionals who have most frequent contact with the court and individuals undergoing trial were interviewed for operational purposes of the study... Key finding revealed that most respondents identified a problem with the existing court fee structure and payment system including controversies with respect to specified and unspecified claims. The new court fee will fill the gap that applied since 1945. So it should be amended in some respects according to the recommendations and steps which should be considered when passing an amended court fee regulation based on this proposal across the three level of federal courts.JEL Classification J33; K00; K41

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Section: The Judicial Budget and Court Feementioning

confidence: 99%

Socioeconomic and legal analysis of court fees structure and payment system in Ethiopia: Towards a policy-oriented approach

Mengistie

2022

JSeD

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“…In the experiment, we adopt the strategy method, i.e., all the participants proceed to litigation, not knowing whether harm occurred or not. However, their payoffs in the trial stage are relevant only in case of harm.4 For comparisons and experimental evidence of litigation spending and deterrence under the American versus English rule, seeGabuthy et al (2021) andMassenot et al (2021).…”

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Deterrence, settlement, and litigation under adversarial versus inquisitorial systems

et al. 2022

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In this paper, we compare deterrence, settlement, and litigation spending under adversarial and inquisitorial systems. We present a basic litigation model with three sequential stages—care, settlement, litigation—and we test the predictions on experimental data. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that, compared with the adversarial system, the inquisitorial system is associated with lower litigation spending, lower rates of cases settled, and tends to strengthen deterrence.

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Einige ökonomische Überlegungen zu (Fehl‑)Anreizen des Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetzes im Strafprozess

Daumann

Follert

2022

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ZusammenfassungDie ökonomische Rechtsanalyse kann durch ihr spezifisches Instrumentarium und ihre Konzentration auf das Effizienzprinzip mögliche Fehlallokationen aufdecken und dem Gesetzgeber Alternativvorschläge unterbreiten. Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich der Rechtsanwaltsvergütung im Strafprozess und arbeitet auf Basis des ökonomischen Ansatzes heraus, dass die gegenwärtige Ausgestaltung des Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetzes sowie die diesbezügliche Ausweitung der Rechte des Angeklagten Anreize setzen, die Verfahrensdauer über ein aus ökonomischer Sicht optimales Niveau hinaus auszudehnen, aus gesamtgesellschaftlicher Sicht ineffizient.

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Legal Fees, Cost-Shifting Rules and Litigation: Experimental Evidence

Cited by 3 publications

References 35 publications

Socioeconomic and legal analysis of court fees structure and payment system in Ethiopia: Towards a policy-oriented approach

Socioeconomic and legal analysis of court fees structure and payment system in Ethiopia: Towards a policy-oriented approach

Deterrence, settlement, and litigation under adversarial versus inquisitorial systems

Einige ökonomische Überlegungen zu (Fehl‑)Anreizen des Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetzes im Strafprozess

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