The purpose of our paper is to generalize the model by Arnott et al. (1990a) to situations with a single origin and destination connected by two routes and to test the analytical results in an experiment with discrete time departure choices. The experimental evidence does not support the theoretical predictions: While the accumulated experience creates significant learning effects which imply a positive evolution of the empirical travel costs towards the equilibrium, the Nash hypothesis is still rejected and the commuting system shows substantial fluctuations until the end of the experiment.

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This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. The main result shows that the settlement rule tends to chill bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations, which implies that automated negotiation is not able to promote agreements. However, this perverse effect depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. The implications of these results are then used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputation mechanisms in Cyberspace.

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