Online Dispute Resolution and Bargaining

Gabuthy, Yannick

doi:10.1023/b:ejle.0000028641.96459.51

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Furthermore, Radner and Schotter (1989) show in an experiment that the linear assumption is consistent with the observed strategies of the players. For a discussion about the additional assumptions made in this model, see Gabuthy (2003). 9 The automated negotiation puts a downward pressure on the plaintiff 's demand only if we consider extreme values of δ which do not exist in the actual procedures.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a discussion about the additional assumptions made in this model, see Gabuthy (2003). 9 The automated negotiation puts a downward pressure on the plaintiff 's demand only if we consider extreme values of δ which do not exist in the actual procedures. Lemma 1.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If the other party accepts the invitation, they will then file a response to the claimant's complaint. 4 From this point, the software accepts sealed offers from the parties and determine whether a settlement occurs according to the following bargaining rule (Gabuthy 2003). Acting independently and without prior communication, plaintiff and defendant submit price offers b P and b D respectively.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the game theoretical analysis of automated negotiation which is based on Gabuthy (2003). This analysis provides the basis to understand the disputants' strategic behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence

Gabuthy

Marchand

2006

SSRN Journal

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Le recours aux mécanismes de résolution des conflits en ligne favorise-t-il l'obtention d'un accord ? Une étude expérimentaleYannick Gabuthy et Nadège Marchand Abstract This paper presents the results of an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internetbased transactions. Automated negotiation is an online sealed-bid process in which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within a prescribed range. The observed individual behavior, based on 40 rounds of bargaining, is shown to be drastically affected by the design of automated negotiation. The settlement rule encourages disputants to behave strategically by adopting aggressive bargaining positions, which implies that the mechanism is not able to promote agreements and generate efficiency. This conclusion is consistent with the experimental results on arbitration and the well-known chilling effect: Automated negotiation tends to "chill" bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations and discourage them to converge on their own. However, this perverse effect induced by the settlement rule depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. RésuméCe papier présente les résultats d'une expérience dont l'objectif est de tester les propriétés d'un nouveau mécanisme de résolution des litiges électroniques (la négociation automatisée). Cette procédure consiste en un programme informatique accessible en ligne qui analyse les propositions d'accord émises par les parties et règle le différend si ces offres appartiennent à un intervalle prédéterminé. Le comportement individuel, observé sur 40 périodes de négociation, apparaît comme fortement influencé par le design de la procédure. La règle de négociation considérée incite les parties à adopter un comportement agressif, ce qui limite la capacité du mécanisme à favoriser la résolution du litige. Conformément aux résultats expérimentaux relatifs à la procédure d'arbitrage, la négociation automatisée crée un effet de glaciation tel que les individus ne sont pas incités à révéler leurs véritables valeurs de réserve et à trouver un accord par eux-mêmes. Cependant, cet effet pervers dépend fortement de l'intensité du conflit opposant les parties. Lorsque la menace d'un désaccord gagne en crédibilité, l'effet stratégique diminue dans la mesure où les défendeurs utilisent la procédure de manière plus efficiente afin de maximiser la probabilité de résolution du litige.

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Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence

Gabuthy

Marchand

2006

SSRN Journal

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“…Recent empirical studies of online auction platforms find that such feedback systems have many positive effects in the sense reputable sellers are more likely to sell their items (Laureti et al 2002, Resnick andZeckhauser 2002), and can expect price premiums (Kalyanam and McIntyre 2001, Lucking-Reiley et al 2006, Resnick et al 2006. However, laboratory evidence shows that reputation systems fail to match the performance of one-on-one long-term relationships and a kind of public good problem may emerge (Bolton et al 2004a(Bolton et al , 2004b(Bolton et al , 2005 parties and determine whether a settlement occurs according to the following bargaining rule (Gabuthy 2004). Our main concern is to investigate this issue by evaluating whether automated negotiation is effectively able to generate efficiency and help the parties to resolve their conflict.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence

Gabuthy¹,

Jacquemet

Marchand

2008

European Economic Review

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This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. The main result shows that the settlement rule tends to chill bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations, which implies that automated negotiation is not able to promote agreements. However, this perverse effect depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. The implications of these results are then used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputation mechanisms in Cyberspace.

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The Surplus Partition in a Simultaneous Offers Bargaining Game

Zhang

Chen

2007

Third International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing (IIH-MSP 2007)

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Online Dispute Resolution and Bargaining

Cited by 7 publications

References 15 publications

Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence

Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence

Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence

The Surplus Partition in a Simultaneous Offers Bargaining Game

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