Legal Tasks for the Sociologist

Auerbach, Carl A.

doi:10.2307/3053047

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…I appended lengthy bibliographies on anthropology, historical jurisprudence, evolutionary theories of law in society, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and structural anthropology, Gluckman and the conflict school, political interpretations of law, psychological approaches to law, and general works on anthropology and sociology of law. Donald Black (a Russell Sage fellow, see below) then introduced the emerging field of sociology of law, with readings by Jerome Skolnick (1965), Philip Selznick (Merton et al 1965), Carl Auerbach (1966 and Karl Llewellyn (1930). Dave taught law in economy and economics: utilitarian theories (Bentham 1980); law in economics (Schumpeter 1954;Calabresi 1968;Davis & Whinston 1961;Demsetz 1967;Olson 1968; and a student paper by Duncan Kennedy "The Utilitarian Model of the Role of Private Law in Economic Change"); Marxist theories of law in economy (Renner 1949;Kelsen 1955;Schlesinger 1945); and most importantly Max Weber (1958;Parsons & Henderson 1964;Aron 2018;Bendix 1966;Lange 1963).…”

Section: Richard Abelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Law and Tradition

Abel

2021

REI

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The four of us came to Yale and the Law and Modernization Program by different routes. I’m going to describe my background because it explains how Dave and I complemented each other. Influenced by Russia’s launch of Sputnik in fall of my senior year in high school and the fact that I was good at math and science, I majored in physics at Harvard. By the end of my second year, however, I realized I didn’t want to be a scientist: I wasn’t good enough, and it would be years before I could do original work. In spring 1960 I took David Riesman’s SocSci 136 course: “American Character and Social Structure.” It was transformative. The course addressed some of my most pressing personal concerns; for instance, we read Riesman’s “The Lonely Crowd” and Paul Goodman’s “Growing Up Absurd” (1960)— critiques of 1950s culture and pressures for conformity. Allowed to write on almost any topic for our term paper (the only requirement), I chose “Attitudes towards science and extra-scientific phenomena: an empirical study among Harvard students.” (Looking back, I think I was seeking justifications for abandoning physics.) Riesman was a fellow of Quincy House, where I lived, and often had lunch with students, encouraging us to voice dissatisfactions with our Harvard education. My section man sent me a long, laudatory letter about the paper. (He was William Gamson, then writing about social movements in opposition to fluoridation, prefiguring today’s anti-vaxers.) Even more important, Riesman wrote every student (perhaps a hundred of us) about our papers. His 3.5-page letter to me concluded: “One of the things which is most desirable about your paper is the topic itself, chosen and pursued with great originality.” I was hooked.[1] I have always tried to emulate his eclectic, qualitative approach. (A lawyer with no formal training in sociology, he was Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences in the Social Relations Department.) The next year I took Paul Freund’s undergraduate course on legal reasoning and felt immediately drawn to law’s pilpul (despite having no background in Talmudic exegesis). I wrote a term paper for him on group libel—only to discover that Riesman had written a long article on the subject (1942)—which, Freund said disparagingly, was the last good thing he ever wrote. In my fourth year I took Talcott Parsons’s first-year graduate course (presumptuously, since I had disdained undergraduate soc rel courses) and was not enamored his formalistic theorizing, which seemed devoid of content. At the same time, I was becoming politically engaged, inspired by the sit-ins and freedom rides (which began in 1960 and 1961, respectively). Although 1950s apathy still pervaded Harvard (the only “demonstration” was a May 1961 protest against changing diplomas from Latin to English), I became active in Tocsin, which opposed above-ground nuclear testing and advocated for nuclear disarmament (doing research and participating in demonstrations in Boston and Washington). What may have clinched my choice of law over sociology graduate school, however, was Columbia’s offer of a full-tuition scholarship (although it was little more than a thousand dollars at the time) and my failure to get a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship. Riesman had urged me to go to Yale Law School for its alleged social science orientation; but I chose Columbia to be close to my girlfriend. (Yes, reader, I married her[2]—and we’re still happily together 58 years later.)

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Section: Richard Abelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Law and Tradition

Abel

2021

REI

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“…In Volume 1, No. 1, the kickoff issue, law professor Carl Auerbach (1966) invited social scientists to help lawyers chart the law's effectiveness and design more effective laws. Sociologist Jerome Skolnick (1966) demurred; drawing on the work of his colleague Philip Selznick (1969), he rejected the instrumentalist agenda Auerbach offered, arguing that the task of the sociology of law was to identify the social conditions in which legality emerges and flourishes.…”

Section: Legality and The Law And Society Traditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legality, Social Research, and the Challenge of Institutional Review Boards

Feeley

2007

Law Soc Rev

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Psychology and legal change: On the limits of a factual jurisprudence.

Haney¹

1980

Law and Human Behavior

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Law and Human Behavior.http://www.jstor.org From its inception, research in "law and psychology" has had an explicitly applied focus. In large part, psychologists have studied legal issues and participated as experts in the legal process in order to improve law and enhance the quality of its justice. This article examines whether and how this can be done. A taxonomy of relationships between the two disciplines is presented which characterizes law and psychology research in terms of its potential for legal change. The use of psychology to effect legal change requires a bringing together of both psychological and legal paradigms. But important differences exist between the styles and methods of reasoning, proof, and justification in psychology and law. The implications of those differences for the use of psychological data in legal change efforts are developed, as are other aspects of "legalism" that may hinder or impede the effectiveness of psychologically oriented law reform. Finally, limitations of a "factual jurisprudence" that derive from the nature of psychological data are examined.

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Legal Tasks for the Sociologist

Cited by 10 publications

References 9 publications

Law and Tradition

Law and Tradition

Legality, Social Research, and the Challenge of Institutional Review Boards

Psychology and legal change: On the limits of a factual jurisprudence.

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