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I shall comment here on the theoretical framework Professor J. H. Skolnick suggests for studies in the sociology of law and the adequacy of the bibliography in his Social Problems article “The Sociology of Law in America: Overview and Trends.” While I welcome Skolnick's emphasis on theory and the “larger philosophical issues,” I think his theoretical orientation would unnecessarily constrict social studies of law.

The call for studies of the social impact of particular judicial, legislative, administrative and executive rules, decisions and practices is sounded sporadically and acted upon but rarely. To read the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States overruling established precedents in many areas of our constitutional law is to catalogue a long list of missed opportunities for social scientists. As an example of the cause for this lament, I shall present Keyishian v. Board of Regents which for all practical purposes overruled Adler v. Board of Education.

Criticism of the administrative process continues to be more cogent than proposed reforms. Some charge that the malaise afflicting agencies is fundamental because it is the inevitable consequence of the dominant pluralistic philosophy. According to Theodore J. Lowi, this philosophy erodes public authority by asking government merely to ratify bargains struck by competing interest groups. Lowi's principal "radical reform" is a quixotic call for the revival of the doctrine that it is unconstitutional to delegate law-making powers to agencies without meaningful legislative standards to circumscribe them. Proponents of participatory democracy charge that agencies satisfy claims of strongly organized groups but not of the weakly organized or unorganized. But participatory democracy is not a panacea and would produce injustices of its own. Probably never before in our history has legal policy been so supportive of the rights of individuals and groups affected by administrative action to be heard and to influence the action taken. Agencies must be receptive to this participatory policy. But they are not umpires or mediators and must be prepared to make conscious value choices in the light of the fullest available knowledge and to defend their choices in the name of justice.

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