Legislative Coalitions and Judicial Turnover under Political Uncertainty

Abstract

While judicial turnover in Latin American high courts is often the result of political realignments within the executive branch, the judiciary may also be sensitive to realignments in the legislative branch. The authors use data from the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court to show that under some circumstances, congressional deputies will seek to remove judges further from their own ideal points as the composition of the legislative coalition changes. This provides some of the first empirical evidence of the role legislatures play in Latin American judicial instability and may be broadly generalizable to other countries with similar institutional profiles and rates of interbranch crisis.

Judicial Instability and Endogenous Constitutional Change: Lessons from Latin America

“…10 5 Chavez 2004;Helmke 2005;Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002;Magaloni and Sanchez 2006;Ríos-Figueroa 2007. 6 Basabe- Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 2013;Lara Borges, Castagnola, and Pérez-Liñán 2012;Leiras et al 2011;Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009. 7 Basabe- Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 2013;Helmke 2005;Leiras et al 2011;Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009;Ríos-Figueroa 2007;Sánchez, Magaloni, and Magar 2011;Skaar 2003.…”

“… 6 Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 2013; Lara Borges, Castagnola, and Pérez-Liñán 2012; Leiras et al 2011; Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009. …”

“… 7 Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 2013; Helmke 2005; Leiras et al 2011; Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009; Ríos-Figueroa 2007; Sánchez, Magaloni, and Magar 2011; Skaar 2003. The pattern is somewhat different in the US context, where a stable institutional environment allows justices to time their retirement strategically.…”

Judicial Politics in Unconsolidated Democracies: An Empirical Analysis of the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court (2008–2016)

“…Since 2008, Ecuador experienced an unexpected period of political stability with the consolidation of a unified government, as Correa managed to hold the majority of seats at the National Assembly (i.e., the former National Congress) (Polga-Hecimovich 2013). Acknowledging previous institutional flaws that threatened judicial independence, the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution reinforced the ECC's authority, eliminated immediate reappointment and legislative impeachment of justices, implemented a nine-year term in office, and a merit-based appointment procedure in Source.…”

Democratic Tradition and the Failed Presidency ofLucioGutierrez inEcuador

“…For instance, the ruling coalition packing the high courts, having Bucaram's pending charges dropped, protestors trying to oust Gutiérrez in April 2005, and the very session during which the president was voted out all illustrate that Ecuador's political actors considered that their goals were more important than the democratic mechanisms to achieve them, even if that entailed the bending or downright violation of the rules of the game. Furthermore, the intervention of high courts, although something not entirely new (see Basabe‐Serrano and Polga‐Hecimovich, ; Conaghan, ), was also a serious blow to the system of checks and balances, which put all three branches of government under the control of the ruling majority. On the other hand, the military's withdrawal of support from the president was not criticised and was even backed by most actors, regardless of their ideological inclinations (De la Torre, : 222).…”