Legislative Cycles in a Semipresidential System

Padovano, Fabio; Gavoille, Nicolas

doi:10.1628/093245617x14810164221319

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…These must be of course adapted to the specific features of the Republic of Korea and to the data available. According to the standard PLC theory, the number of laws depends on the size of the government majority over the minimum required for approving a law, on the fragmentation of the government majority, on the timing of the parliamentary closures, on the parliamentary experience of the ministers and on a number of other factors specific to the sample under scrutiny (Lagona et al 2015;Padovano and Gavoille, 2017).…”

Section: The Logic Of the Plc Extended To A Country Undergoing A Process Of Democratizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This paper also provides some innovations to both strands of literature. On the side of the PLC, the theory has received a substantial amount of supportive empirical tests, in a wide variety of institutional contexts: parliamentary systems like Italy (Lagona and Padovano, 2008;Lagona et al, 2015), presidential systems such as the Czech Republic (Brechler and Gersl, 2014), supranational institutions as the European Parliament (Kovats, 2009), staggered legislations such as those of Germany and Japan, (Goetz et al 2014) and semi-presidential systems like France (Padovano and Gavoille, 2017). Yet all these tests have been conducted on samples where the level of democracy is quite high (Polity IV scores of 8 and more) and, most of all, constant over time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How does legislative behavior change when the country becomes democratic? The case of South Korea

Lagona

Padovano

2021

European Journal of Political Economy

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The Political Legislation Cycle theory predicts a peak of legislative production in the preelectoral period, when legislators focus on voters' welfare to be reelected. This paper verifies the theory on South Korean legislative production and is the first test of the theory in a country undergoing a process of democratization. Two insofar untested hypotheses are being verified: 1) peaks of legislative production should increase with the degree of democracy; 2) as the party system and the mechanisms of legislative checks and balances develop, the PLC should become more evident in bills of legislative rather than executive's initiative. A hurdle model estimated on both laws of parliamentary proposal and of government assignment lends empirical support to both hypotheses, with the noticeable feature that PLC in Korea appear more in the form of an upward trend than of pre-electoral peaks.

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Section: The Logic Of the Plc Extended To A Country Undergoing A Process Of Democratizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How does legislative behavior change when the country becomes democratic? The case of South Korea

Lagona

Padovano

2021

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…Theénarques turn out to be less likely ghosts. This has to be related to Padovano and Gavoille (2017), who observe that the higher the number of ENA graduates in the government, the lower the legislative production. This suggests thaténarques may use their technical competence in favor of a higher qualitative legislative output, rather than a quantitative achievement.…”

Section: The Characteristics Of the Ghost Deputiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who are the ‘ghost’ MPs? Evidence from the French parliament

Gavoille

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

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This paper studies the characteristics of the ghost deputies of the French National Assembly, i.e. deputies who do not have any official recorded activity over a whole year. Using a rich dataset providing various information about all deputies from 1959 to 2012, the results indicate that the typical ghost deputy is an old man with a low level of schooling, member of a large party which does not support the government and who is elected in jurisdiction with a low level of political competition. However, personal characteristics are less and less correlated with performance over the years. Finally, ghost deputies face more difficulties to achieve reelection, but are penalized only at the first round, voters exclusively considering national factors at the second round.

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“…In other words, the opposite cycles of laws and decrees re ect the different periods of the legislature when either special interest groups or voters are expected to be relatively more active, thus attracting the legislator's attention. In particular, evidence of PLC has been found in the European Parliament (Kovats, 2009), in that of the Czech Republic, regardless of the subject matter of the law (Brechler and Gersl, 2011), in the French National Assembly for both legislative and presidential elections (Padovano and Gavoille, 2017) and in that of South Korea, with increasing magnitude as the country became more democratic (Lagona and Padovano, 2021). Finally, Padovano and Sy (2023) exploit a new dataset that includes the legislative activity of 19 countries, mainly from 1975 to the 2010s, to analyze in a comparative setting how institutional features affect the size of the PLC.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Cycles of Decrees: Evidence From the Italian Parliament 1

Lagona,

Mingione,

Padovano

2023

Preprint

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This research provides an empirical test of the predictions of the Political Legislation Cycle theory about decrees using disaggregated data made recently available by official databanks of the Italian Republic. The analysis focuses on the five different types of decrees for which long enough data series are available: law-decrees (decreti legge), legislative decrees (decreti legislativi), DPR (decrees of the President of the Republic), implementing decrees (decreti attuativi) and independent decrees (decreti indipendenti). Multiple sources of latent heterogeneity affect the production of decrees due to multilevel factors that operate jointly with observed covariates at all levels of the hierarchy of the data. We account for these factors by estimating a multilevel negative binomial regression model with random effects on the mean for repeated measurements of disaggregated counts of decrees, implemented under multiple Italian governments, nested within the first 17 legislatures of the Italian Republic. The estimates of the model broadly confirm the theory’s prediction that decrees tend to be approved in the earlier stages of the legislature; this prediction receives stronger support the more the institutional characteristics of each type of decree resemble those of the theoretical variable. Finally, the analysis confirms the prediction of the PLC theory about the legislators’ choice of the legislative instruments through which they satisfy the conflicting interests of special interest groups and voters, shedding light on the timing of the activities of lobbies. JEL classification codes: D72, C49, H61, H62

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Legislative Cycles in a Semipresidential System

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

How does legislative behavior change when the country becomes democratic? The case of South Korea

How does legislative behavior change when the country becomes democratic? The case of South Korea

Who are the ‘ghost’ MPs? Evidence from the French parliament

The Cycles of Decrees: Evidence From the Italian Parliament 1

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