2018
DOI: 10.1177/1465116518757701
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Legislative Participation in the EU: An analysis of questions, speeches, motions and declarations in the 7th European Parliament

Abstract: Which legislative activities in the European Parliament are ‘pluralistic’ – i.e. undertaken by all Members of the European Parliament, irrespective of legislative and electoral status? What type of parliamentary activity – if any – is dominated by party leaderships or vote-seekers in the European Union? This study will advance our knowledge of legislative politics in the EU by determining whether its legislature conforms to expectations from the legislative behaviour literature. This study compares the partici… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…My findings strengthen the claim of scholars that procedures matter and can affect individual legislators' behavior (Cox and McCubbins 2005;Friedman and Friedberg 2021;Sorace 2018). Based on the analysis of the allocation of resources and the degree to which legislative and non-legislative activities impose participation costs on individual legislators (Sorace 2018), these legislators prefer unconstrained, public legislative and non-legislative tools, but they also use tools that are unconstrained or semi-constrained that are just on the record, as a second-best choice. In addition, the dominancy of the party is relevant too for the strategic use of legislative and non-legislative tools.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 82%
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“…My findings strengthen the claim of scholars that procedures matter and can affect individual legislators' behavior (Cox and McCubbins 2005;Friedman and Friedberg 2021;Sorace 2018). Based on the analysis of the allocation of resources and the degree to which legislative and non-legislative activities impose participation costs on individual legislators (Sorace 2018), these legislators prefer unconstrained, public legislative and non-legislative tools, but they also use tools that are unconstrained or semi-constrained that are just on the record, as a second-best choice. In addition, the dominancy of the party is relevant too for the strategic use of legislative and non-legislative tools.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 82%
“…Krehbiel (1992) defined legislative organization as "the allocation of resources and assignment of parliamentary rights to individual legislators or groups of legislators" (p. 2). Sorace (2018) argued that legislative activities differ in the degree to which they impose participation costs on individual legislators. Procedures can shape the ability of legislators to take a position, oversee the government and set an agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005;Koger 2003).…”
Section: The Procedures Of Legislative and Non-legislative Toolsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…There are also legislative behavior differences between committee chairs and EP backbenchers. The former have privileged access to at least one parliamentary activity that is more constrained procedurally, namely oral questions, whereas they tend to ask fewer written questions (Sorace 2019).…”
Section: Why Does It Matter Who Chairs An Ep Committee?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of the empirical predictions of this theory is that parties would exploit committee assignment to reward loyal members and punish those who do not toe the party line at roll-call votes. Several authors have speculated that dissenting against the EPG's voting positions would sideline MEPs for committee chairmanships (Ripoll Servent 2018: 192;Sorace 2019), in a similar manner in which this happens for rapporteurships (Yoshinaka et al 2010;Yordanova 2011b). As frequent dissenting voting behavior might indicate divergent ideological preferences, EPGs would try to avoid such nominations in order to minimize policy drift.…”
Section: H2: Higher Chair Seniority Increases the Likelihood Of Beinmentioning
confidence: 99%