Partisanship is a powerful driver of economic perceptions. Yet we know less about whether other political divisions may lead to similar evaluative biases. In this paper, we explore how the salient divide between “Remainers” and “Leavers” in the UK in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum has given rise to biased economic perceptions. In line with the cognitive dissonance framework, we argue that salient non-partisan divisions can change economic perceptions by triggering processes of self- and in-group justification. Using both nationally-representative observational and experimental survey data, we demonstrate that the perceptions of the economy are shaped by the Brexit divide and that these biases are exacerbated when respondents are reminded of Brexit. These findings indicate that perceptual biases are not always rooted in partisanship, but can be triggered by other political divisions.

Which legislative activities in the European Parliament are ‘pluralistic’ – i.e. undertaken by all Members of the European Parliament, irrespective of legislative and electoral status? What type of parliamentary activity – if any – is dominated by party leaderships or vote-seekers in the European Union? This study will advance our knowledge of legislative politics in the EU by determining whether its legislature conforms to expectations from the legislative behaviour literature. This study compares the participation patterns in the EP7 (2009–2014) parliamentary questions, speeches, motions and written declarations via multilevel negative binomial regression. It makes use of a dataset on activity levels and demographics of 842 individual Members of the European Parliament serving between 2009 and 2014. The findings highlight that highly procedurally constrained activities, such as speeches and oral questions, are dominated by frontbenchers and vote-seekers, while procedurally ‘freer’ activities – written questions in particular – are very representative of the population of Members of the European Parliament. The analysis finds that there are both ‘pluralistic’ and vote-seeking activities in the ‘second order’ EU legislature, and that participation patterns broadly conform to patterns found in other established representative democracies.

Are European Parliament (EP) elections used to pass judgement on the legislative behaviour of parties serving in the EP? Do Europeans give a bonus in EP elections to political parties whose members were highly active during the legislative term? The article will focus on the role of legislative activities in the eighth EP term (2014–2019) in informing the 2019 vote choice. The analysis combines the European Election Studies (EESs) 2019 Voter Study data with original legislative behaviour data, as well as with data on European electoral systems. The evidence points to productivity-based retrospective voting being a feature of the 2019 elections. Furthermore, the analysis finds that this type of retrospective voting is stronger in countries where electoral rules encourage candidates to promote past legislative records in electoral campaigns, and particularly so for voters that paid attention to the EP campaign in such systems. This has significant implications for the retrospective voting and EU elections literatures, since it is evidence that the very demanding democratic desiderata of retrospection can be met in multi-level and supranational contexts as well.

The analysis compares voters' preferences in economic policy to political parties' economic written parliamentary questions during the 2009-2014 term of the European Parliament. The corpus of over 55,000 written questions was ideologically scaled via crowdsourcing. The analysis shows that parties are unresponsive to second-order and to disengaged voters. The results also suggest that there is no upper class bias in European Parliament political representation. The data highlight a strong tendency of EP7 political parties to cluster around the position of the average European voter, at the expense of their average supporter. The democratic deficit is therefore at most a pluralism deficit in the European Parliament, since substantive representation in the European Parliament is successful as far as the majoritarian norm is concerned.

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