Legislative Representation in a Single-Member versus Multiple-Member District System: The Arizona State Legislature

Ideological extremism and electoral design. Multimember versus single member districts

“…Further, the MMD chamber has wider variances in ideal-point estimates than the SMD chamber. These general results are consistent with previous findings (Adams 1996;Richardson et al 2004). Strikingly, however, the more precise predictions regarding numerical candidate competition in elections derived by Cox (1990a;1990b) are not supported.…”

“…Second, the Illinois legislature used a cumulative MMD system, which was unique at the time it was in place, has not been used in any state since 1982, and generates different incentives for legislators' behavior than the more prevalent bloc with partial abstention form of MMD (Cox 1990b). Richardson et al (2004) test for ideological extremism in the Arizona state legislature and provide evidence for the ideological extremism hypothesis. Using a scale of interest group endorsements as a measure of legislator preferences, they compare the distribution of preferences in the MMD House and SMD Senate, the differences between legislators within the same geographic districts, and the distributions across party caucuses.…”

“…If candidates make one set of campaign statements and subsequently break those promises in office, then ideological inconsistencies from the campaign to roll-call voting reduce the likelihood of finding ideological extremism based on electoral system. This, of course, is likewise true of studies that use interest group ratings or other ideology estimates based on revealed preferences once in office (e.g., Adams 1996;Richardson et al 2004). One possible reason for revealed preference stability from campaign to office is "ideological branding"(Dougan and Munger 1989;Enelow and Munger 1993): candidates' ideological reputations make their campaign commitments more credible, but also constrain them as legislators to positions close to those taken on the campaign trail.…”

“…Formal theoretical models suggest that MMD legislators will move away from the median voter under certain conditions (Cox 1984(Cox , 1990a(Cox , 1990b(Cox , 1997, but there are few empirical examinations of how MMDs affect floor-voting behavior in state legislatures (Adams 1996;Jewell 1982aJewell , 1982bRichardson et al 2004). These empirical studies have relied on interest group ratings, interviews, or a few select roll-call votes as proxy indicators of legislator ideology, but none have used large numbers of roll calls over several legislative sessions (compare Wright and Schaffner 2002).…”

Candidate Extremism and Electoral Design in U.S. State Legislative Elections

“…Like Merrill and Adams (), Adams () also uses spatial models to make a similar argument as Cox (), and finds support for a “centrifugal” effect from increased proportionality in his analysis of district magnitude variation in the Illinois General Assembly. Richardson, Russell, and Cooper (), also find support for Cox's () hypothesis in their examination of Arizona state legislator voting behavior following the 1998 elections. Unlike Richardson, Russell, and Cooper (), who use interest group scores to quantify state legislator ideology, Bertelli and Richardson () reexamine legislator behavior in Arizona using W‐NOMINATE scaling of member ideal points and also find that multiseat districts tend to produce more extreme legislators than single‐seat districts.…”