Legislature size and government spending in Italian regions: Forecasting the effects of a reform

Abstract

We analyze the effect of different legislature size on per capita regional expenditure in Italy. According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending because logrolling and transaction costs may have canceling effects. We find a large and significantly positive effect of the number of legislators. We use these findings to forecast the effects of the increase in the number of legislators that is taking place in some regions: a 10% increase in legislature size commands on average a 12% increase in per capita regional expenditure. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Legislature size, Regional expenditure,

Government Spending, Shocks, and the Role of Legislature Size: Evidence from the American States*

“…However, a positive relationship between lower chamber size and welfare spending per capita does exist, but this finding is partially offset by an inverse relationship between upper chamber size and welfare spending per capita. This inconclusive result supports the theory that increases in legislature size may have offsetting effects (see Crain, (; McCormick and Tollison, ; Shugart and Tollison, ; Fiorino and Ricciuti, ). Finally, I find an inverse relationship between the first difference of total spending per capita and lower‐to‐upper chamber size, as predicted by Chen and Malhotra (), but the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant.…”

“…While McCormick and Tollison () only discussed legislative output, the theory was expanded to include government expenditures by Shugart and Tollison () and Fiorino and Ricciuti ().…”

“…As Fiorino and Ricciuti () point out, the empirical results stemming from this literature have been mixed as well.…”

“…WhileMcCormick and Tollison (1981) only discussed legislative output, the theory was expanded to include government expenditures byShugart and Tollison (1986) andFiorino and Ricciuti (2007).3As Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007) point out, the empirical results stemming from this literature have been mixed as well.4 Universalism is the assumption that all interested legislators will receive their desired spending project, regardless of whether they are a part of the minimum winning coalition.5 One exception isPrimo (2006), who finds a negative and statistically relationship between lower chamber size and spending.…”

The Law of 1/n Revisited: Distributive Politics, Legislature Size, and the Costs of Collective Action

“…Crain () argues that increases in legislature size may have an ambiguous effect on the production of legislation, as the higher costs of collective action may be partially offset by increases in specialization among legislators. Fiorino and Ricciuti () offer empirical evidence in this vein, finding a positive relationship between legislature size and government spending for Italian regional governments. Hankins () tests the effects of legislature size on state spending, particularly in response to shocks, and finds little evidence of a positive relationship—a result which is interpreted as supporting the idea that larger legislatures face higher costs associated with interest groups and lobbying.…”