Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence

Finlay, Christopher J.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00345.x

Cited by 12 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…This runs counter to most recent work on legitimate authority, which has argued for moral equivalence between state and non-state groups [Fabre 2008;Finlay 2010;Reitberger 2013;Schwenkenbecher 2013]. I agree with this equivalence thesis for private wars and for public wars in defence of 12 I owe this point to Jonathan Parry.…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 49%

Authorization and The Morality of War

Lazar

2015

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 49%

Authorization and The Morality of War

Lazar

2015

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…The rest of the community, including the victims, will have different views as to whether intervention should take place, and some of its members might reasonably object to it. Some may be pacifist, some may be afraid of the risks for the long term stability and independence of their community, some might fear the impact that the interveners will have on cultural or political practices, whose importance for the local conception of the good life is not adequately recognized by outsiders –say, because the value of this conception of the good life is the object of reasonable disagreement (Finlay , 293–94). Insofar as these members are committed to deciding together what should happen to them (more on this below), and they exercise their right to do so by mixing their agency in the way described by the Interactional Account, they retain a claim against unwanted interference.…”

Section: Political Self‐determination and Interventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The view defended here is of course premised on the rejection of Kant's idea that the only body capable of acting on behalf of a political community is its government (Flikschuh ; Korsgaard , 254; Ripstein, 336; see also, Smith ). Insightful discussions of how the notion of authorization operates in this context are Finlay ; Lazar ; Benbaji .…”

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confidence: 99%

Revolution and Intervention

Renzo

2019

Nous

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Provided that traditional jus ad bellum principles are fulfilled, military humanitarian intervention to stop large scale violations of human rights (such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) is widely regarded as morally permissible. In cases of “supreme humanitarian emergency”, not only are the victims morally permitted to rebel, but other states are also permitted to militarily intervene. Things are different if the human rights violations in question fall short of supreme humanitarian emergency. Because of the importance of respecting political self‐determination, in cases of “ordinary oppression”, we normally think that rebellion might be permissible, but not military humanitarian intervention. Thus, according to the received view, the conditions for the permissibility of intervention coincide with the conditions for the permissibility of revolution in cases of supreme humanitarian emergency, but not in cases of ordinary oppression. In cases of ordinary oppression there is an asymmetry between the conditions for the permissibility of revolution and intervention (call this the Asymmetry View). Should we accept the Asymmetry View? I answer this question by outlining an account of political self‐determination and by illustrating the complex role that this notion should play in discussing the morality of revolution and intervention.

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“…One promising proposal, suggested by several theorists, appeals to the notion of consent or authorization. 21 The claim here is that an independent and necessary condition of justified defensive harm is that one have the consent of those on whose behalf it is employed (or, at very least, that they do not overtly refuse). This consent requirement, as I will call it, gains intuitive support from judgments about simple cases of individual defense.…”

Section: Defending the Restrictive Authority Criterionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legitimate Authority and the Ethics of War: A Map of the Terrain

Parry¹

2017

Ethics int. aff.

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Despite a recent explosion of interest in the ethics of armed conflict, the traditional just war criterion that war be waged by a “legitimate authority” has received relatively little attention. Moreover, of those theorists who have addressed the criterion, many are deeply skeptical about its moral significance. This article aims to add some clarity and precision to the authority criterion and the debates surrounding it, and to suggest that this skepticism may be too quick. The first section analyzes the authority criterion and reveals that there are at least two distinct moral claims associated with it, each requiring separate evaluation. The second section outlines an increasingly influential “reductivist” approach to just war theory, explaining how this approach grounds powerful objections to the authority criterion. The third section sketches the most promising strategies for providing a qualified defense of authority, while acknowledging the further questions and complications these strategies raise. Importantly, the article aims to rehabilitate the authority criterion from within a broadly reductivist view.

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Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence

Cited by 12 publications

References 2 publications

Authorization and The Morality of War

Authorization and The Morality of War

Revolution and Intervention

Legitimate Authority and the Ethics of War: A Map of the Terrain

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