Legitimacy of Control

Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovič, Radovan

doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00315.x

Cited by 63 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 47 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Unfortunately, recruiting more subjects in Experiment 5 was beyond our financial budget. 18 Two replication and extension studies of F&K's medium control treatment, Hagemann (2007) and Schnedler and Vadovic (2011), validate our experimental results in their replication treatments. spectrum of individual characteristics, subjective attitudes to control and information about the workplace environment.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 59%

“…This total effect can be expressed as the sum of the direct and indirect effects of control which are given by 2 max{x − x NC , 0} and 2(x C − max{x, x NC }) respectively (Schnedler and Vadovic 2011). The indirect effect of control is positive if either x C > x > x NC or x C > x NC ≥ x, in which case there are hidden benefits of control.…”

Section: Falk and Kosfeld's Main Treatments And Hidden Costs Of Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Hidden costs of control: four repetitions and an extension

Ziegelmeyer¹,

Schmelz²,

Ploner

2011

Exp Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We report four repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5): [1611][1612][1613][1614][1615][1616][1617][1618][1619][1620][1621][1622][1623][1624][1625][1626][1627][1628][1629][1630] 2006) low and medium control treatments with 476 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool of students and demographics vary across samples. We largely confirm the existence of hidden costs of control but, contrary to the original study, hidden costs of control are usually not substantial enough to significantly undermine the effectiveness of economic incentives. Our subjects were asked, at the end of the experimental session, to complete a questionnaire in which they had to state their work motivation in hypothetical scenarios. Our questionnaires are identical to the ones administered in Falk and Kosfeld's (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5):1611-1630, 2006) questionnaire study. In contrast to the game play data, our questionnaire data are similar to those of the original questionnaire study. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, we report an extension with 228 subjects where performance-contingent earnings are absent i.e. both principals and agents are paid : Experimental Economics ; 15 (2012), 2. -S. 323-340 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007 according to a flat participation fee. We observe that hidden costs significantly outweigh benefits of control under hypothetical incentives.

show abstract

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 59%

Section: Falk and Kosfeld's Main Treatments And Hidden Costs Of Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hidden costs of control: four repetitions and an extension

Ziegelmeyer¹,

Schmelz²,

Ploner

2011

Exp Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The most common response was 'distrust', especially among agents who reacted negatively to control. The authors' results suggest that, at least in a laboratory environment, rigid attempts to control agents' behavior can 'backfire'; the authors also provide some support for the external validity of their results by administering a survey eliciting students' self-reported 'work motivation' in a variety of hypothetical work situations involving different degrees of employer control or trust.In a clever variation on Falk and Kosfeld's design, Schnedler and Vadovic (2007) show that control by principals does not elicit negative reactions from agents when the principal's control is legitimized in two alternative ways. In one of these, the principal must set a common control policy that applies not only to the agent, but also to a computerized 'automaton' agent who supplies minimum effort whenever this is allowed.…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?

Charness

Kühn

2011

Handbook of Labor Economics

214

102

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab? *This paper surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We begin with a discussion of methodological issues: why (and when) is a lab experiment the best approach; how do laboratory experiments compare to field experiments; and what are the main design issues? We then summarize the substantive contributions of laboratory experiments to our understanding of principal-agent interactions, social preferences, unionfirm bargaining, arbitration, gender differentials, discrimination, job search, and labor markets more generally. JEL Classification:C9, J0Keywords: labor economics, laboratory experiments, principal-agent theory, personnel economicsCorresponding author:Peter Kuhn Department of Economics University of California Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA E-mail: pjkuhn@econ.ucsb.edu * Manuscript prepared for Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 4, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors. We thank Michael Kuhn and Loni Spilberg for excellent research assistance. We have done our utmost to identify as many lab experimental papers in labor economics as possible, and to represent the results of these papers accurately. Given the volume of recent research in this area and the deadline we have faced in writing this review, it is inevitable that we have missed some important work. We also sincerely hope that we have not mischaracterized any paper's conclusions. The authors apologize for these limitations in advance and nevertheless hope that our review provides a helpful guide to the 'lab labor' literature to date.The economics literature has witnessed an explosion of laboratory experiments in the past 20 years. Many of these experiments have focused on topics that are central to the field of labor economics, including how workers respond to various forms of compensation, and the economics of discrimination, arbitration, bargaining, and matching. In this chapter we survey the contributions of laboratory experiments to our understanding of these questions.We begin our review with a discussion of methodological issues: First, we pose the general question of why (and more importantly when) a labor economist might want to conduct a laboratory experiment: What types of questions, if any, are laboratory experiments best suited to answer? How do laboratory experiments compare to field experiments? Next, once one has decided to conduct a laboratory experiment, how should it be designed? Here we review the main methodological decisions an experimenter typically needs to make, and the advantages and disadvantages of the various choices.The second half of our review turns its attention to the substantive issues in labor economics that have been addressed using laboratory experiments. While these are wideranging, we focus our review on the set of issues that have generated probably the largest volume of experimental papers in labor economics: the effects of compensation policies on the supply of effort by workers. We do this in two parts. The firs...

show abstract

“…4 However, this 2 A closely related literature documents possibly deleterious effects of monitoring and control (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006;Schnedler and Vadovic, 2011;Ploner et al, 2011). Von Siemens (2013) attributes such effects to negative reciprocity.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Playing ‘hard to get’: An economic rationale for crowding out of intrinsically motivated behavior

Schnedler¹,

Vanberg²

2014

European Economic Review

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Anecdotal, empirical, and experimental evidence suggests that offering extrinsic rewards for certain activities can reduce people's willingness to engage in those activities voluntarily. We propose a simple rationale for this `crowding out' phenomenon, using standard economic arguments. The central idea is that the potential to earn rewards in return for an activity may create incentives to play `hard to get' in an effort to increase those rewards. We discuss two specific contexts in which such incentives arise. In the first, refraining from the activity causes others to attach higher value to it because it becomes scarce. In the second, restraint serves to conceal the actor's intrinsic motivation. In both cases, not engaging in the activity causes others to offer larger rewards. Our theory yields the testable prediction that such effects are likely to occur when a motivated actor enjoys a sufficient degree of `market power.' Key words intrinsic motivation, crowding out, behavioural economics, market power, hidden information JEL Classification: D1, M5, D8, D4, C9 AcknowledgementsWe gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from the editor and two anonymous referees.

show abstract

Legitimacy of Control

Cited by 63 publications

References 47 publications

Hidden costs of control: four repetitions and an extension

Hidden costs of control: four repetitions and an extension

Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?

Playing ‘hard to get’: An economic rationale for crowding out of intrinsically motivated behavior

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About