Effective states govern by some combination of enforcement and voluntary compliance. To contain the COVID-19 pandemic, a critical decision is the extent to which policy makers rely on voluntary as opposed to enforced compliance, and nations vary along this dimension. While enforcement may secure higher compliance, there is experimental and other evidence that it may also crowd out voluntary motivation. How does enforcement affect citizens’ support for anti–COVID-19 policies? A survey conducted with 4,799 respondents toward the end of the first lockdown in Germany suggests that a substantial share of the population will support measures more under voluntary than under enforced implementation. Negative responses to enforcement—termed control aversion—vary across the nature of the policy intervention (e.g., they are rare for masks and frequent for vaccination and a cell-phone tracing app). Control aversion is less common among those with greater trust in the government and the information it provides, and among those who were brought up under the coercive regime of East Germany. Taking account of the likely effectiveness of enforcement and the extent to which near-universal compliance is crucial, the differing degrees of opposition to enforcement across policies suggest that for some anti–COVID-19 policies an enforced mandate would be unwise, while for others it would be essential. Similar reasoning may also be relevant for policies to address future pandemics and other societal challenges like climate change.

What is an effective vaccination policy to end the COVID-19 pandemic? We address this question in a model of the dynamics of policy effectiveness drawing upon the results of a large panel survey implemented in Germany during the first and second waves of the pandemic. We observe increased opposition to vaccinations were they to be legally required. In contrast, for voluntary vaccinations, there was higher and undiminished support. We find that public distrust undermines vaccine acceptance, and is associated with a belief that the vaccine is ineffective and, if enforced, compromises individual freedom. We model how the willingness to be vaccinated may vary over time in response to the fraction of the population already vaccinated and whether vaccination has occurred voluntarily or not. A negative effect of enforcement on vaccine acceptance (of the magnitude observed in our panel or even considerably smaller) could result in a large increase in the numbers that would have to be vaccinated unwillingly in order to reach a herd-immunity target. Costly errors may be avoided if policy makers understand that citizens’ preferences are not fixed but will be affected both by the crowding-out effect of enforcement and by conformism. Our findings have broad policy applicability beyond COVID-19 to cases in which voluntary citizen compliance is essential because state capacities are limited and because effectiveness may depend on the ways that the policies themselves alter citizens’ beliefs and preferences.

We report four repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5): [1611][1612][1613][1614][1615][1616][1617][1618][1619][1620][1621][1622][1623][1624][1625][1626][1627][1628][1629][1630] 2006) low and medium control treatments with 476 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool of students and demographics vary across samples. We largely confirm the existence of hidden costs of control but, contrary to the original study, hidden costs of control are usually not substantial enough to significantly undermine the effectiveness of economic incentives. Our subjects were asked, at the end of the experimental session, to complete a questionnaire in which they had to state their work motivation in hypothetical scenarios. Our questionnaires are identical to the ones administered in Falk and Kosfeld's (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5):1611-1630, 2006) questionnaire study. In contrast to the game play data, our questionnaire data are similar to those of the original questionnaire study. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, we report an extension with 228 subjects where performance-contingent earnings are absent i.e. both principals and agents are paid : Experimental Economics ; 15 (2012), 2. -S. 323-340 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007 according to a flat participation fee. We observe that hidden costs significantly outweigh benefits of control under hypothetical incentives.

When another person tries to control one's decisions, some people might comply, but many will feel the urge to act against that control. This control aversion can lead to suboptimal decisions and it affects social interactions in many societal domains. To date, however, it has been unclear what drives individual differences in control-averse behavior. Here, we address this issue by measuring brain activity with fMRI while healthy female and male human participants made choices that were either free or controlled by another person, with real consequences to both interaction partners. In addition, we assessed the participants' affects, social cognitions, and motivations via self-reports. Our results indicate that the social cognitions perceived distrust and lack of understanding for the other person play a key role in explaining control aversion at the behavioral level. At the neural level, we find that control-averse behavior can be explained by functional connectivity between the inferior parietal lobule and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, brain regions commonly associated with attention reorientation and cognitive control. Further analyses reveal that the individual strength of functional connectivity complements and partially mediates the self-reported social cognitions in explaining individual differences in control-averse behavior. These findings therefore provide valuable contributions to a more comprehensive model of control aversion.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Control aversion is a prevalent phenomenon in our society. When someone tries to control their decisions, many people tend to act against the control. This can lead to suboptimal decisions such as noncompliance to medical treatments or disobeying the law. The degree to which individuals engage in control-averse behavior, however, varies significantly. Understanding the proximal mechanisms that underlie individual differences in control-averse behavior has potential policy implications, for example, when designing policies aimed at increasing compliance with vaccination recommendations, and is therefore a highly relevant research goal. Here, we identify a neural mechanism between parietal and prefrontal brain regions that can explain individual differences in control-averse behavior. This mechanism provides novel insights into control aversion beyond what is accessible through self-reports.

Significance The challenge of securing adherence to public health policies is compounded when an emerging threat and a set of unprecedented remedies are not fully understood among the general public. The evolution of citizens’ attitudes toward vaccination during the COVID-19 pandemic offers psychologically and sociologically grounded insights that enrich the conventional incentives- and constraints-based approach to policy design. We thus contribute to a behavioral science of policy compliance during public health emergencies of the kind that we may increasingly face in the future. From early in the pandemic, we have tracked the same individuals, providing a lens into the conditions under which people’s attitudes toward voluntary and mandated vaccinations change, providing essential information for COVID-19 policy not available from cross-section data.