Letting “the people(s)” decide: peace referendums and power-sharing settlements

Abstract

Referendums are increasingly used to legitimate power-sharing settlements in deeply divided societies transitioning from violent conflict. This article assesses the use of the referendum to legitimate power sharing, focusing on the capacity of referendum rules to facilitate the 'voice' of multiple groups or 'peoples' engaged in a 'constitutional moment.' Drawing on the constitutional referendums in Northern Ireland in 1998 and Iraq in 2005, I demonstrate that referendum rules matter in highlighting the variable degrees of support for the elite-negotiated deal on the part of the contending groups. The institutional design process prior to the referendum is crucial for incentivising groups to support the settlement, particularly the previously dominant group. When faced with a choice between a simple majority threshold and countermajoritarian procedures, majoritarianism is appropriate only in so far as the main groups see their constitutional preferences satisfied and concurrent majorities can be secured. A qualified majority referendum threshold to protect a minority groups is appropriate for divided states where the groups are regionally concentrated and when the groups agree to such rules.

The rise of research on independence referendums

“…By bypassing parliaments and governments, direct democracy considerably reduces the accountability of elected representatives to reach decisions adopted in the name of the people. In the special case of independence referendums, the risk of a tyranny of the majority is even more present if minorities have not been secured previously (McEvoy, 2018).…”

Understanding Power‐Sharing Performance: A Lifecycle Approach

“…For evidence of adoptability, we would expect that elites who agree to a deal are convinced they can carry their supporters with them. Popular expression of support, or indeed objection, can be demonstrated via parliamentary elections or a constitutional/peace referendum as a ratification device (McEvoy 2018). As Dodge details, Iraq serves as a warning about the merits of putting a settlement to a referendum when one group (the formerly dominant Sunni community) is opposed to it.…”

Referendums as a political party gamble: A critical analysis of the Kurdish referendum for independence

“…There has been a significant interest in the use of referendums as a conflict management and resolution tool in divided societies (Lee and Mac Ginty, 2012; McEvoy, 2018; Mac Ginty, 2003; Qvortrup, 2018b). For instance, referendums were held in Burundi, Cyprus, Northern Ireland and South Africa to legitimise power-sharing pacts by popular vote (McEvoy, 2018: 865). Eritrea, Colombia, Cyprus and East Timor can be given as examples of cases where referendums were in one way or another perceived as tools for ending conflicts.…”

“…For instance, in the case of Colombia, the referendum over the peace process actually delayed peace (Gomez-Suarez, 2017) while in the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland referendums ended conflicts peacefully (Lee and Mac Ginty, 2012: 44). Referendums can also be used to establish new states, revising constitutions or creating new ones as well as for establishing sub-autonomy (McEvoy, 2018: 865). The cases of New Caledonia and Bougainville are the most recent examples to demonstrate the power of referendums in creating new states (Collin, 2019: 139; Qvortrup 2018b).…”