2011
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1943446
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Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment

Abstract: This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers' performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the supervisors, but at least one third of them bias their report. Both selfish black lies (increasing the supervisor's earnings while decreasing the worker's payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the earnings of both) acc… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(16 citation statements)
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References 33 publications
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“…Consistent with this expectation,Rosaz and Villeval (2012) provide evidence that supervisors selfishly misreport subordinate performance to present themselves in a better light if they expect a certain payoff attached to this presentation. 3 Impression management tactics are known to be present at various levels in firms, ranging from the subordinate ingratiating the supervisor to receive better performance evaluations, selecting highly paid peers to increase CEO compensation, to strategically choosing favorable information for earnings benchmarks(Faulkender and Yang 2010;Gordon 1996;Schrand and Walther 2000).4 We label supervisors' behavior that is purely geared towards the increase of their performance rating to positively affect their financial payoff as opportunistic.…”
supporting
confidence: 53%
“…Consistent with this expectation,Rosaz and Villeval (2012) provide evidence that supervisors selfishly misreport subordinate performance to present themselves in a better light if they expect a certain payoff attached to this presentation. 3 Impression management tactics are known to be present at various levels in firms, ranging from the subordinate ingratiating the supervisor to receive better performance evaluations, selecting highly paid peers to increase CEO compensation, to strategically choosing favorable information for earnings benchmarks(Faulkender and Yang 2010;Gordon 1996;Schrand and Walther 2000).4 We label supervisors' behavior that is purely geared towards the increase of their performance rating to positively affect their financial payoff as opportunistic.…”
supporting
confidence: 53%
“…Overtreatment and overcharging have been found also with car mechanics [39]. The abuse of hierarchical positions in social interactions is another source of unethical behavior, notably through biased evaluation of employees [40].…”
Section: Lying Social Preferences and Strategic Interactionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To circumvent this problem, economists and psychologists developed recently simple techniques to measure dishonesty in total privacy. Besides reporting the outcome of a dice roll in private (e.g., Shalvi et al, 2011;Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013;Hao and Houser, 2013;Gächter and Schultz, 2016), they include coin flips (e.g., Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011;Houser et al, 2012;Abeler et al, 2014), reports on real-effort outcomes (e.g., Mazar et al, 2008;Rosaz and Villeval, 2012). In mind games, the experimenter knows the result of the random draw, but payment depends on the self-reported accuracy of a prior prediction (Jiang, 2013;Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%