Life-Cycle Equilibrium Unemployment

Abstract

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Directed search over the life cycle

“…The assumption of directed search seems natural, as workers are likely to know the requirements and employment conditions of the jobs for which they apply. 7 Second, we assume that vacant jobs specify both the experience and the age requirements that a worker needs to have in order to be hired. 8 The assumption may seem strong, as in many countries …rms are legally forbidden from explicitly discriminate workers based on age.…”

“…The only signi…cant di¤erence is with respect to the production function g(y) required to match the age pro…le of wages. 7 In a recent survey of the US labor market, Hall and Krueger (2008) …nd that 84 percent of white, male, non-college workers either "knew exactly" or "had a pretty good idea" about how much their current job would pay from the very beginning of the application process (at the time of the …rst interview). 8 Assuming that the vacancy speci…es the hiring conditions rather than a menu of contracts, one for a worker of each type (i.e.…”

Dépréciation du capital humain et formation continue au cours du cycle de vie : Quelle dynamique des externalités sociales ?

“…Comme l'ont déjà souligné Chéron, Hairault et Langot [2011, 2013, les effets d'horizon associésà unâge de retraite, relativement plus faible en France par rapportà la moyenne OCDE, sont en partie responsables de ce diagnostic. Depuis 2003, les réformes successives du système de retraite français 1 ont conduità un relèvement de l'âge effectif de départ qui,à l'inverse, a favorisé l'emploi des seniors, avec un relèvement de plus de 12 points du taux d'emploi des 55-59 ans, et supérieurà 8 points pour les 60-64 ans.…”

Retirement intentions in the presence of technological change: theory and evidence from France

“…Ljunqvist and Sargent (2008), Cheron et al (2013) and Saint-Paul (2009) support the view that it is not in the interest of firms to invest in workers having a short working horizon. Langot and Moreno-Galbis (2013) find that for homogeneous productivity workers, only positions occupied by young workers are updated.…”