Limitations to subnational authoritarianism: Indonesian local government head elections in comparative perspective

Buehler, Michael; Nataatmadja, Ronnie; Anugrah, Iqra

doi:10.1080/13597566.2021.1918388

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…The originalists have powerful reasons in believing that there is nothing more precisely to explain the constitution's intent than the framers of the constitution themselves. 31 When there is a problem related to the constitution, the statements of the formulators/constitutional drafters can significantly influence the judge in his decision compared to the statements of other parties. It is time for this nation to get out of the old paradigm that is based on views.…”

Section: B Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Regulation of Continuous Election Design’s Implementation Based on the Constitutional Court’s Decision

Rishanda¹

2021

Constitutionale

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This study aims to describe the consistency of judges' considerations in the Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013 and the Constitutional Court Decision No. 55/PUU-XVII/2019 and its suitability with the design of the election administration according to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. To measure the consistency of the two Constitutional Court Decisions, the meaning of the original intent of holding elections simultaneously according to the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia will be used. This is normative legal research, which uses approach legislation (statute approach) and historical approach (historical approach). The results of this study indicate that the judge's considerations in the Constitutional Court Decision 14/PUU-XI/2013 are inconsistent with the Constitutional Court Decision 55/PUU-XVII/2019. Based on the original intent study, the Amendrs to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia disagreed on the simultaneous implementation of the General Election in Indonesia. So the judge's consideration in the Constitutional Court's decision Number 14/PUU-XI/2013, which requires simultaneous elections, is not following the design of the election administration according to the amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Six alternatives for the simultaneous implementation of elections.

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Section: B Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Regulation of Continuous Election Design’s Implementation Based on the Constitutional Court’s Decision

Rishanda¹

2021

Constitutionale

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“…National government still determines most governmental tasks and controls most of the public budget and the national election commission regulates and controls subnational elections. However, Buehler, Nataatmadja, and Anugrah (2021) also point out that institutions are most likely not sufficient to explain the absence of local authoritarian regimes in Indonesia. Very importantly, voters are not economically dependent on local (political) elites.…”

Section: Horizontal Spill-over Between Electoral Arenasmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Despite these powers, local government heads were not able to establish an authoritarian regime in their local jurisdictions. In part, Buehler, Nataatmadja, and Anugrah (2021) ascribe this to the impact of other institutions that inhibit the extent to which local government heads can engage in electoral engineering. National government still determines most governmental tasks and controls most of the public budget and the national election commission regulates and controls subnational elections.…”

Section: Horizontal Spill-over Between Electoral Arenasmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This makes Indonesian voters relatively economically independent. For example, rural voters do not depend on one type of agricultural commodity for their livelihood (Buehler, Nataatmadja, and Anugrah 2021). 13 In sum, local government head elections in Indonesia provides for an example that, as in the case of horizontal spill-over, the identification of vertical spill-over requires one to establish whether the 'trigger' that produces a particular electoral outcome originates from an electoral arena situated at a higher or lower territorial scale and cannot be ascribed to the political mobilization of territorial cleavages that run across several jurisdictions.…”

Section: Horizontal Spill-over Between Electoral Arenasmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Horizontal and vertical spill-over in multilevel electoral systems

Schakel

Romanova

2021

Regional & Federal Studies

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A multilevel electoral system perspective reveals several ways in which electoral spill-over may occur. Vertical spill-over may be top-down from the national to the regional level or can be bottom-up from the regional to the national electoral arena. Horizontal spill-over happens when developments in one regional electoral arena impact electoral outcomes in another regional electoral arena. The literature on regional elections has mainly focused on vertical top-down spill-over. In this introduction, we discuss two main insights in relation to spill-over between electoral arenas that surface when considering the collection of articles and reports presented in this fourth annual review of regional elections. First, we discuss how horizontal spill-over can be identified and differentiated from diffusion of electoral developments driven by territorial cleavages. Second, we discuss several institutions that impact vertical spill-over. We conclude by considering a wider research agenda for the study of spill-over in multilevel electoral systems.

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“…Salah satu instrumen demokrasi adalah Pemilu sebagai sarana untuk menyalurkan aspirasi masyarakat melalui proses pemilihan. Walaupun dalam praktiknya Pemilu di Indonesia telah dilaksankan dengan cara yang baik, dan hal tersebut menunjukkan bahwa proses Pemilu di negara kita sudah semakin demokratis dimana setiap pemimpin dan wakil rakyat dipilih langsung oleh masyarakat, tentunya dalam menyukseskan proses Pemilu tersebut butuh keterlibatan semua pihak terkait termasuk pelibatan masyarakat sipil (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019;Buehler, Nataatmadja, & Anugrah, 2021;Fionna & Hutchinson, 2019;Qodari, 2010).…”

Section: Grafik 1 Lima Alasan Publik Puas Terhadap Sistem Demokrasi D...unclassified

Kampung Pengawasan Partisipatif dan Road Map Indeks Kerawanan Pemilu di Kabupaten Indramayu

Irawan

2022

JAP

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This study aims to determine the effectiveness of the participatory monitoring village program in preventing election violations. This research uses a qualitative method with a case study approach that analyzes the phenomenon of election supervision, election violations in the implementation of the 2019 Election and the 2020 Pilkada associated with the participatory monitoring village program which establishes the rambatan wetan village as a pilot project for the participatory monitoring center with the consideration that the wetan rambatan village is a zero village. offense and close to the city center. The results of the study show that the participatory monitoring village program does not consider data on election violations and the election vulnerability index in the 2020 elections so that its implementation is predicted to be less than optimal in preventing and suppressing election violations, the program should be mapped to villages with minimal knowledge, low participation and villages that have The potential for high vulnerability to violations is placed in several villages so that they can become a catalyst for Bawaslu in mapping and compiling an election vulnerability index in stages so that potential vulnerabilities can be prevented. The Participatory Monitoring Village Program should be optimized by paying attention to data on violations and vulnerabilities in order to prepare for the 2024 election design which is predicted to be very complex, because Election Oversight, potential violation vulnerabilities and the election vulnerability index are components that cannot be separated as an instrument of election supervision.

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Limitations to subnational authoritarianism: Indonesian local government head elections in comparative perspective

Cited by 11 publications

References 37 publications

The Regulation of Continuous Election Design’s Implementation Based on the Constitutional Court’s Decision

The Regulation of Continuous Election Design’s Implementation Based on the Constitutional Court’s Decision

Horizontal and vertical spill-over in multilevel electoral systems

Kampung Pengawasan Partisipatif dan Road Map Indeks Kerawanan Pemilu di Kabupaten Indramayu

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