Linear complementarity models of Nash-Cournot competition in bilateral and POOLCO power markets

Hobbs, Benjamin

doi:10.1109/59.918286

Cited by 499 publications

(166 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Reference [28] gives the conditions that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the CSFE for each area solved in Step 2. 3 The above two steps are repeated until convergence, which is achieved when the SFs and network status do not change in two consecutive iterations. Unlike [19], for this study the electrical characteristics of the transmission networks have been neglected.…”

Section: Csfe With Network Capacity Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics of Market Power in ERCOT System: A Fundamental CSFE With Network Constraints

Díaz

Webster

Villar

et al. 2016

IEEE Trans. Power Syst.

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Previous studies of market power within a regional system have considered multiple competing generation operators and the role of transmission constraints. However, these studies typically assume simplified structures in which each operator is restricted to a unique node in a transmission constrained network. Real systems typically have operators making decisions for units in several zones at once. Past studies also implicitly treated market power as a static concept for a given set of market rules and network configuration. We demonstrate that market power is dynamic, and can vary significantly with fuel prices and even with large-scale weather patterns. We also demonstrate the impact on region-wide market power of operators that manage units in multiple zones. We use the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) as an illustrative case study, and apply a conjectured supply function equilibrium (CSFE) approach that accounts for transmission constraints. We show that the companies with greater influence on the market price will depend on the relative prices of coal and natural gas. We also show that a weather event, such as a period without any wind, can have a substantial impact on market power.

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Section: Csfe With Network Capacity Constraintsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics of Market Power in ERCOT System: A Fundamental CSFE With Network Constraints

Díaz

Webster

Villar

et al. 2016

IEEE Trans. Power Syst.

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“…It has been widely applied to politics, economics, management, bioengineering, etc., and it has been used by lots of studies on the electricity market as well. To name a few, the supply function model or Cournot model on the competition of the generation entities are given respectively in [1][2][3]. The bidding strategies of three traditional generation the four electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) levels and the Cask principle is discussed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Tripartite Game Model for Electricity Pricing in Consideration of the Power Quality

2017

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Under the Energy Internet concept the distribution and management of resources in the electricity market have been gradually transiting from a centralized pattern to a decentralized pattern. Correspondingly, the methodological model for the analysis of economic behaviors needs to be upgraded too. Based on the idea of non-cooperative game theory, this paper puts forward a tripartite game model for electricity pricing in consideration of the power quality, which is applicable to the electricity market under the Energy Internet with distributed generation, including the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), generating companies (GENCOs) and the marketers which correspond to the regional power-retailing companies. Then, the sequential quadratic programming based on the quasi-Newton method is given to solve the game model. Finally, four sets of tests with different game factors are carried out to verify the validity and feasibility of the proposed model and algorithm. The SGCC price, the cost and the number of GENCOs and the cross-regional environment are considered in each test, respectively. The results show that this model can adapt well to the various conditions.

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“…2a) has been studied extensively in other frameworks (e.g., equilibrium models [37][38][39]), it has only been studied to a limited extent in PBUC electricity storage arbitrage models. First, references [16,31] assume a monthly linear relationship between the price and system load for the DA market in the United States' PJM region, obtained by using ordinary least squares regression.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price-based unit commitment electricity storage arbitrage with piecewise linear price-effects

Brijs

Geth

Siddiqui

et al. 2016

Journal of Energy Storage

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Electricity storage plants can be used for many applications, with one of the most studied applications being arbitrage in the day-ahead market. Terms of use: Documents inAlthough the arbitrage value is related to the presence of price spreads, it also depends on the effect of (dis)charge actions on prices, as arbitrage generally reduces price spreads by increasing off-peak prices when charging and decreasing peak prices when discharging. As such, there are two important assumptions in price-based unit commitment arbitrage models: first, whether the storage operator is assumed to have perfect knowledge of future prices, and second, whether they recognize that their (dis)charge actions may affect those prices, i.e., the price-taking or pricemaking assumption. This article proposes a comprehensive formulation of the arbitrage problem including detailed operating constraints, and focuses on relaxing the price-taking assumption by considering real-world price-effect data, published in the form of hourly piecewise linear relationships between quantity and price based on submitted bids, which are referred to as "market resilience functions". These can be used to (1) evaluate the price-taking and price-making assumptions based on simplified price-effects, and to (2) provide an upper limit to the arbitrage value under the assumption that prices and price-effects are known at the decision stage. In addition, a stepwise approximation to the piecewise linear functions is developed to reduce computation time, i.e., from mixed-integer nonconvex quadratic programming to mixed-integer linear programming, while providing lower-and upper bound approximations to the arbitrage value. The developed models are applied to the Belgian day-ahead market for 2014, and show that the price-effect has a strong impact on the operation and arbitrage value of large-scale storage.

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Linear complementarity models of Nash-Cournot competition in bilateral and POOLCO power markets

Cited by 499 publications

References 19 publications

Dynamics of Market Power in ERCOT System: A Fundamental CSFE With Network Constraints

Dynamics of Market Power in ERCOT System: A Fundamental CSFE With Network Constraints

The Tripartite Game Model for Electricity Pricing in Consideration of the Power Quality

Price-based unit commitment electricity storage arbitrage with piecewise linear price-effects

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