Linguistic Approaches to Philosophical Problems

Ambrose, Alice

doi:10.2307/2021362

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…My motivation here is the relative absence of the work from the journal after 1963 and the work's sympathy for what were then, from the journal's perspective, non-standard forms of analysis or unfashionable, including speculative, authors. Analytic contributions in JoP include ordinary language philosophy (e.g., Ambrose (1952) and Ebersole (1956)) and logical empiricism (e.g., Nagel (1953) and Feigl (1958)), but also a variety of other analytic approaches, as is seen in the criticism of ordinary language philosophy's methods and results (e.g., Chisholm (1952) and Danto (1958)).…”

Section: Classifying British and American Philosophy During The Periomentioning

confidence: 99%

Analytic philosophy, 1925–69: emergence, management and nature

Katzav

2018

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

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This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalise rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterising this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925-1969, a sectarian form of critical philosophy.

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Section: Classifying British and American Philosophy During The Periomentioning

confidence: 99%

Analytic philosophy, 1925–69: emergence, management and nature

Katzav

2018

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

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“…Recepcija se nastavlja u rasponu od prihvaćanja (Ambrose 1967), preko analize odnosa metafilozofije i filozofije jezika (Rorty 1967) No, i bez takve filološke analize, u međuvremenu možemo protiv Lazerowitzove dijagnoze o "nepostojanju neosporenih stavova u fi lozofiji" konstatirati da shvaćanje metafilozofije na matrici termina i pojma metafizika posve sigurno pripada u "osporene tvrdnje" filozofije, kako to pokazuje sâma povijest analitičke filozofije, odnosno povijest njezinog "nasljeđivanja" filozofije. Ono se vidi ili iz unutar-filozofske perspektive, poput logičke kritike jezika filozofije kod "ranog" Witt gensteina iz Traktata, ili pak s izvan-filozofskog gledišta, poput kri tike filozofije sa stanovišta analize svakodnevnog jezika kod "kasnog" Wittgensteina iz Filozofskih istraživanja.…”

Section: Sažetakunclassified

Lazareti metafilozofije: metafizika i metoda u autoterapijskim diskursima filozofije

Mikulic¹,

Borislav²

2020

Metafilozofija I Pitanja Znanstvene Metodologije: Radovi Petog Okruglog Stola Odsjeka Za Filozofiju

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“…Ambrose continues: ‘Philosophical views quite clearly…appear to state matters of fact. To take some sample illustrations: a physical object is a bundle of properties…it is impossible to know other people exist, motion is impossible, etc.’ (1952, p. 290). Philosophy is therefore typically ‘carried on in the language of assertion, i.e., of truth and falsity’ (Ambrose, 1966, p. 84).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But let's start with what at least seems to be the prevailing and, on the face of it, rather innocuous view – that philosophers, like any serious inquirer, aim to say something true about the world. Alice Ambrose labels this ‘the orthodox position’, which ‘describes philosophy as a pursuit of truth, where “pursuit of truth” is interpreted in conformity with common usage as the attempt to acquire knowledge about our world’ (Ambrose, 1952, p. 289) 1 . This reading of philosophy seems to capture how philosophers typically package their utterances.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophical Speech Acts

Shields¹

2020

Philosophy

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The prevailing view among contemporary analytic philosophers seems to be that, as philosophers, we primarily issue assertions. Following certain suggestions from the work of Rudolf Carnap and Sally Haslanger, I argue that the non-assertoric speech act of stipulation plays a key role in philosophical inquiry. I give a detailed account of the pragmatic structure of stipulations and argue that they are best analyzed as generating a shared inferential entitlement for speaker and audience, a license to censure those who give uptake to the stipulation but do not abide by this entitlement, and as justified on the basis of the speaker and audience's shared ends. In presenting this account, I develop a novel taxonomy for making sense of criticisms of speech act performances generally and clarify the notions of successful speech act performance and uptake. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of this view of stipulation for recasting and advancing philosophical disputes, I apply my account to two case studies – the first concerns Iris Marion Young's analysis of the concept of oppression and the second involves Saul Kripke's and Hilary Putnam's accounts of the concept of reference.

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Linguistic Approaches to Philosophical Problems

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Analytic philosophy, 1925–69: emergence, management and nature

Analytic philosophy, 1925–69: emergence, management and nature

Lazareti metafilozofije: metafizika i metoda u autoterapijskim diskursima filozofije

Philosophical Speech Acts

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