2007
DOI: 10.1177/1532673x07300565
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Linking Judicial Selection to Consensus

Abstract: This article focuses on differences in judicial ideology as an explanation of judicial consensus or disagreement in state supreme court decision making. First, state methods of judicial selection (election vs. appointment) are posited to influence the ideological composition of state supreme courts. Second, variations in ideological composition are related to the degree of consensus among judges on cases in the area of capital punishment. Factors other than selection mechanism and judicial ideology are conside… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…The process of judicial selection consequently produces state judges with varying backgrounds in terms of professional experience (Hall and Bonneau, 2006), ideology (Boyea, 2007), gender (Bratton and Spill, 2002; Hurwitz and Lanier, 2003), and race (Hurwitz and Lanier, 2003). Research on state courts also illustrates that selection procedures for state judges systematically condition the behavior of judges (Boyea, 2007; Brace and Boyea, 2008; Brace and Hall, 1990, 1993, 1997; Hall, 1987, 1992, 2001b; Traut and Emmert, 1998), affecting judicial choice where judges are fearful of electoral sanction by voters. Relevant to this study, the electoral connection between judges and voters induces judges to join majority decision coalitions (Brace and Hall, 1993; Hall, 1987; Sheldon, 1999).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The process of judicial selection consequently produces state judges with varying backgrounds in terms of professional experience (Hall and Bonneau, 2006), ideology (Boyea, 2007), gender (Bratton and Spill, 2002; Hurwitz and Lanier, 2003), and race (Hurwitz and Lanier, 2003). Research on state courts also illustrates that selection procedures for state judges systematically condition the behavior of judges (Boyea, 2007; Brace and Boyea, 2008; Brace and Hall, 1990, 1993, 1997; Hall, 1987, 1992, 2001b; Traut and Emmert, 1998), affecting judicial choice where judges are fearful of electoral sanction by voters. Relevant to this study, the electoral connection between judges and voters induces judges to join majority decision coalitions (Brace and Hall, 1993; Hall, 1987; Sheldon, 1999).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%