We analyze subprime consumer lending and the role played by down payment requirements in screening high-risk borrowers and limiting defaults. To do this, we develop an empirical model of the demand for financed purchases that incorporates both adverse selection and repayment incentives. We estimate the model using detailed transaction-level data on subprime auto loans. We show how different elements of loan contracts affect the quality of the borrower pool and subsequent loan performance. We also evaluate the returns to credit scoring that allows sellers to customize financing terms to individual applicants. Our approach shows how standard econometric tools for analyzing demand and supply under imperfect competition extend to settings in which firms care about the identity of their customers and their postpurchase behavior.
September 2009Please do not circulate or post online Abstract. We study pricing and contract design in the subprime auto sales market. We develop a model of the demand for …nanced purchases that incorporates both adverse selection and moral hazard e¤ects, and estimate the model using detailed transactionlevel data. We use the model to quantify selection and repayment problems and show that di¤erent contracting terms, in particular car price and required down payment, resolve very di¤erent pricing trade-o¤s. We also evaluate the returns to credit scoring that allows sellers to customize …nancing terms to individual applicants. Our empirical approach shows how standard tools for analyzing demand and supply in traditional product markets extend to contract markets where agreement and performance are separated in time, so …rms care about both the quantity and quality of demand.We are grateful to many seminar participants for many useful comments.