We develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts. We account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk (claim rate) and risk aversion. We find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes. In addition, women are more risk averse than men, risk aversion exhibits a U-shape with respect to age, and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion. Finally, unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk, and, as we illustrate, has important implications for insurance pricing. (JEL D81, G22)

We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral (“moral hazard”) response to insurance, a phenomenon we label “selection on moral hazard.” Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.

International tourism is a fast growing industry generating half a trillion dollars in annual revenues and accounting for almost 10% of total international trade, and almost half of total trade in services. Yet, it has so far failed to receive the attention it deserves from mainstream economics. This paper attempts to provide an initial understanding of the determinants of international tourism. This paper claims that international tourism, as other forms of trade in services, is driven by unique factors of production, and may be better dealt with in a single industry study rather than in a general equilibrium trade model. In order to understand these determinants the world is viewed as a market of differentiated products, and a discrete choice estimation technique is applied to a large three-dimensional data set of tourist flows. It is shown that a relatively simple estimation technique, combined with a rich data set, can deliver reasonable substitution patterns. It is found, among other things, that political risk is very important for tourism, and that exchange rates matter mainly for tourism to developed countries. These have exchange rate elasticity of about one.

We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.