After an average of four years of supplementation, the combination of beta carotene and vitamin A had no benefit and may have had an adverse effect on the incidence of lung cancer and on the risk of death from lung cancer, cardiovascular disease, and any cause in smokers and workers exposed to asbestos.

CARET participants receiving the combination of beta-carotene and vitamin A had no chemopreventive benefit and had excess lung cancer incidence and mortality. The results are highly consistent with those found for beta-carotene in the Alpha-Tocopherol Beta-Carotene Cancer Prevention Study in 29133 male smokers in Finland.

YKL-40 is found in increased quantities in the serum and lungs in a subgroup of patients with asthma, in whom expression of chitinase in both compartments correlates with the severity of asthma. The recovery of YKL-40 from these patients indicates either a causative or a sentinel role for this molecule in asthma.

We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral (“moral hazard”) response to insurance, a phenomenon we label “selection on moral hazard.” Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.

We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.