Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders

Matsumura, Toshihiro; Yamagishi, Atsushi

doi:10.1007/s11149-017-9334-x

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Cited by 8 publications

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“…This assumption is standard in the literature and is employed by a series of works by Etro (2004Etro ( , 2006Etro ( , 2007Etro ( , 2008. See also Ino and Matsumura (2012) and Matsumura and Yamagishi (2017b). 5 We can show that no other equilibrium exists.…”

Section: Stackelberg Casementioning

confidence: 81%

Entry License Tax: Stackelberg versus Cournot

Cato¹,

Matsumura²

2019

JITE

Self Cite

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This study investigates how leadership affects public policies in markets where the number of firms is endogenously determined. We focus on the relationship between the relative efficiency of an incumbent firm and the optimal entry tax (entry barrier). We find that this relationship depends on whether the incumbent can commit to the output before the entries of new firms. The optimal entry tax is decreasing (res. increasing) in the productivity of the incumbent when it takes (res. does not take) leadership. We also find that the optimal entry barrier occurring when the incumbent takes leadership is lower than that when it does not.

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