Lobbying “from within”: A new perspective on the revolving door and regulatory capture

Abstract

This study explores the revolving door phenomenon–when public office holders move back and forth from the public to the private sector, often becoming lobbyists–and its implications on regulatory capture. It draws on the literature on regulatory capture theory and 46 interviews conducted in Quebec with public officers (ministers, chiefs of staff, deputy ministers, and heads of governmental organizations) whose career path includes a revolving door scenario, as well as observers of the phenomenon. New light is shed on capture theory by using a broad definition of the revolving door that focuses on the entry stage. A key finding is that “cultural capture” can occur when new public officers come from the same private sector now within their purview. Based on public officers’ allegiance to their former industry, lobbying is de facto exerted, “from within.” Despite clear irregularities and conflicts of interest, most of those interviewed do not believe in tightening rules and prefer continuing with vigilance from public office holders, journalists, and other observers.

Canada's Lobbying Industry: Business and Public Interest Advocacy from Harper to Trudeau

“…Key recent contributions (Boucher, 2015(Boucher, , 2018Boucher and Cooper, 2019;Cooper and Boucher, 2019;Graham et al, 2020;Yates and Cardin-Trudeau, 2021) have begun to address the paucity of research on Canada's lobbying industry. Our wide-angle overview of lobbying representation and access builds on this work and provides context for more focused case studies.…”

“…We also did not track the individuals who lobby or the public officials being lobbied. Following Boucher and Cooper (2019) and Yates and Cardin-Trudeau (2021), more work might focus on the backgrounds of consultants, whose role has grown in recent years, and revolvers (indiviudals that move between private and public sectors), including examining how partisan connections may have shaped their rise or fall after the change of government.…”

“…Echoing concerns about elite power structures (regarding the backgrounds of state elites), Yates and Cardin-Trudeau (2021) meanwhile examine "lobbying from within"-the way that new public officers hailing from the private sector bring perspectives and allegiances from their former industry into the state.…”

Lopsided lobbying? Regulatory opportunism and the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying

“…Scholars have puzzled about the influence of political elites returning to government as lobbyists, creating a circle of power rarely punctured by the public. Alternatively, Yates and Cardin-Trudeau (2021) reverse the causal arrows and observe public office holders' allegiance to their former industry. Other prominent works have been occupied with evaluating or recommending policy for regulatory frameworks (Opheim 1991;Santos and Costa 2014;Chari, Murphy and Hogan 2017;Yates and Beauchamp 2008).…”

Tiempos De Pandemia: Élites E Influencia en Centroamérica

“…Así, estudiamos las conexiones político-empresariales que dan cuenta de i) la capacidad de las élites de defender de manera colectiva intereses propios y ii) la transferencia de sesgos pro-mercado, favoritismo y conflicto de intereses que facilitan la creación de redes de actores con acceso privilegiado. La ocupación de cargos en los puestos ministeriales marca una impronta sobre la política general de gobierno pues favorece el "cabildeo desde adentro" (lobbying from within) por parte de actores con intereses distintos a los del resto de la población (Yates y Cardin-Trudeau 2021).…”