Lobbying in Europe: New Firm-Level Evidence

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may No 2071 / June 2017Abstract Lobbying can provide policy makers with important sector-specific information and thereby facilitating informed decisions. If going far beyond this, in particular if successfully influencing policy makers to unnecessarily tighten regulation or not opening already excessively regulated markets, it could potentially reduce overall economic welfare. We create a unique firm-level database on EU lobby activity and firm characteristics. We tend to find that firms in more protected sector, e.g. firms from non-tradable or higher regulated sectors tend to spend more for lobby activities. Also such firms tend to have higher profit margins and lower productivity, as often the case in sheltered sectors.JEL classification: D72, D78, O38

How European Markets Became Free: A Study of Institutional Drift

“…Greenwood and Dreger (2013) estimated as of 2013 that 75% of businesses and 60% of NGOs active in engaging EU political We can perform a potentially more precise comparison using firm-level data. In the EU, Dellis and Sondermann (2017) estimate an elasticity of lobbying expenditures to log-sales of 0.153 in 2017. Using a sample of US firms form Compustat, we obtain an elasticity more than four times larger (0.620).…”

Bits and bolts

“…An increasing scale of a few firms may also mean fewer buyers in input markets and local labour marketsmonopsonypotentially impacting contractual terms for suppliers and workers (OECD, 2008;OECD, forthcoming). In addition, lobbying is more likely to be undertaken by larger firms and by firms in concentrated markets, which may inform policy differentially in concentrated industries (Dellis and Sondermann, 2017). Last but not least, high concentration may impact firm risk-taking behaviour if they are seen as "too big to fail".…”

The Rise of Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: An Agenda for Future Research

“…Macro‐level studies on EU interest organization populations either rely on categorizations of interest organizations that neglect firms altogether, focusing exclusively on associations representing business interests and non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) (Berkhout and Lowery, 2010; Berkhout et al ., 2015; Beyers 2004; Carroll and Rasmussen 2017; Dür et al ., 2015; Dür and Mateo, 2016; Hanegraaff and Berkhout, 2018; Wonka et al ., 2010), or rely on a cross‐sectional designs that make it impossible draw inferences on over‐time variations in the relative presence of firms within such communities (see Berkhout et al ., 2018). A number of micro‐level studies investigating the determinants of firms' choices to engage in direct lobbying have recently contributed to shedding systematic light on the role of firms in the politics of interest representation in the EU (Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2009; Dellis and Sondermann, 2017). Yet, again, the cross‐sectional design of these works, as well as their exclusive focus on firms, make them ill‐equipped to shed light on whether the share of firms lobbying in the EU increased over time relative to other interest organizations.…”