Lobbying versus litigation: political and legal strategies of interest representation in the European Union

Bouwen, Pieter; McCown, Margaret

doi:10.1080/13501760701243798

Cited by 89 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…However, others provide evidence that EU interest groups form or participate in short-term, ad hoc coalitions which are more suitable to the supranational, dynamic EU environment and its issue arenas (Pijnenburg 1998 ;Warleigh 2000 ;Rozbicka 2013 ). Interest groups' influence and participation in the EU communities are related to the groups' ability to efficiently transform and transmit information (Chalmers 2011 ;Bouwen and McCown 2007 ;Coen 1997 ). As EUlevel policymaking is separate from the national implementation efforts, interest group involvement in implementation efforts plays only a minor role for groups' incorporation into the community (Knill and Liefferink 2007 ;Falkner et al 2005 ).…”

Section: Policy Streammentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest groups in multiple streams: specifying their involvement in the framework

Rozbicka

Spohr

2015

Policy Sci

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Although interests inhabit a central place in the multiple streams framework (MSF), interest groups have played only a minor role in theoretical and empirical studies until now. In Kingdon's original conception, organized interests are a key variable in the politics stream. Revisiting Kingdon's concept with a particular focus on interest groups and their activities-in different streams and at various levels-in the policy process, we take this argument further. In particular, we argue that specifying groups' roles in other streams adds value to the explanatory power of the framework. To do this, we look at how interest groups affect problems, policies, and politics. The influence of interest groups within the streams is explained by linking the MSF with literature on interest intermediation. We show that depending on the number of conditions and their activity level, interest groups can be involved in all three streams. We illustrate this in case studies reviewing labor market policies in Germany and chemicals regulation at the European level.

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Section: Policy Streammentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest groups in multiple streams: specifying their involvement in the framework

Rozbicka

Spohr

2015

Policy Sci

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“…Financial contribution and legal tactics, in turn, are central to US lobbying. By contrast, campaign financing is not possible in EU politics and the use of lawyers much less common for advocacy work in Brussels (see Bouwen and McCown, 2004).…”

Section: Comparing Us and Eu Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison

Woll

2012

Int Groups Adv

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Executive Summary Lobbying on both sides of the Atlantic has experienced a considerable boom in the last 50 years and one could be led to believe that the two industries look increasingly alike. Lobbyists have become highly professionalized and master a multitude of venues and levels of political authority. Direct representation of companies or other stakeholders co-exists with associational representation in both Washington DC and Brussels, even though peak associations play a greater role in Europe. The use of some instruments is different, however, in particular financial contributions and legal tactics, which are central in the United States (US) and much less common in the European Union (EU). What is more, observers of lobbying in the US and the EU have noted the markedly different lobbying styles: frequently aggressive advocacy approach in the US and a more consensus-oriented informational lobbying in the EU. While US groups and lobbyists oftentimes defend their immediate interest by trying to exert pressure on public officials, EU representatives seem to be more soft-spoken in their approach and are said to work in a more constructive manner with bureaucratic and political representatives. After developing a description of what makes up the respective styles, this article discusses cultural and institutional explanations cited in the literature. Rather than seeing lobbying styles as culture traits, it discusses the institutional constraints affecting lobbying behavior. In particular, the passage rate of proposals, the fragmentation of public media, the electoral structure and the transparency of political negotiations create different incentive structures in the US and the EU. However, lobbying styles are more than the cumulative effect of these different elements. They are linked to the nature of the political system, of which the institutional constraints are a reflection. The US, a fully established federal system, relies on majority decision-making. This creates an adversarial culture and 'winner-takes-all-politics'. The EU, by contrast, functions as a complex intergovernmental system with a high degree of supranational centralization. The resulting tension between integration and inter-state bargaining creates a system that relies on consensus-building. In this context, the access of private actors to supranational institutions depends on their contribution to the creation of problem-solving policy approaches. As long as the EU has to rely on the acceptance of its policy outputs for its legitimacy, we are bound to find many individual r

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“…Formal access could indirectly have structuring effects on the membership environment by making certain organizations more attractive to potential members than other organizations. Access is also the first step for policymakers toward making substantive policy concessions favorable to the constituents of the interest organization (Bouwen and McCown, 2007).…”

Section: The Logic Of Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

Why interest organizations do what they do: Assessing the explanatory potential of ‘exchange’ approaches

2013

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Lobbying versus litigation: political and legal strategies of interest representation in the European Union

Cited by 89 publications

References 41 publications

Interest groups in multiple streams: specifying their involvement in the framework

Interest groups in multiple streams: specifying their involvement in the framework

The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison

Why interest organizations do what they do: Assessing the explanatory potential of ‘exchange’ approaches

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