Interest groups' many and varied attempts to influence EU public policy are well documented. Research on EU interest politics has made considerable progress in the analysis of both the access and voice strategies they use as they seek to influence the policy process. Other scholars have focused on the legal strategies that private actors deploy when they endeavour to shape public policy by bringing cases before the ECJ. Although both lobbying and litigation strategies have been well studied in the context of European integration and are, in principle, available to most business interest groups, few scholars have asked what determines actors' selection of one or the other in their pursuit of policy change. This paper attempts to bridge these two strands of research and theory by offering a framework in which private actors' choice between lobbying and litigation can be understood and hypotheses about their behaviour derived.

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Attentiveness to and transparency about the methodological implications of the level of analysis selected for peace and conflict exercises constitute essential elements of good game design. The article explores the impact of level of analysis choices in the context of two key portions of exercises, scenario construction and role specification. It weighs the consequences of these choices in terms of the differing conclusions one can draw from exercises and potential pitfalls of careless choices. Finally, it argues that level of analysis considerations in game design parallels specific debates within segments of the social science literature, connections that are also explored in this article for their relevance to game design.Peace and conflict exercises 1 are widely used in teaching and analytical contexts as ways to think through and gain traction over these complex, often ill-defined, phenomena. Using exercises has many potential advantages, ranging from affordability to portability (depending on design), but in almost all circumstances their chief benefit is the