Local and Direct EM Injection of Power Into CMOS Integrated Circuits

Poucheret, François; Tobich, Karim; Lisarty, M.; Chusseauz, L.; Robissonx, B.; Maurine, Philippe

doi:10.1109/fdtc.2011.18

Cited by 37 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Many information mentioned in this section refer to Dehbaoui et al(2012) and Poucheret et al (2011).…”

Section: Em Cartographymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The minimum distance between the two clusters is equal to 214.2 µm. It is far beyond the displacement step of a typical EM campaign, which is of the order of tens of µm (for instance, 15 µm in Poucheret et al, 2011). This distance also determines a region that is significantly bigger than the sensitive area locally involved in an EM attack in [ µm ]…”

Section: Sign-off Power Analysis On a Cryptographic Circuit 31 Devimentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Forecasting the Effects of Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Embedded Cryptosystems

Alberto

Maistri

Leveugle

2013

Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective

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This work deals with the electromagnetic pulses (EMP) injection of transient faults into embedded cryptosystems. The purpose of this study is to deepen the understanding of the interaction of an electromagnetic (EM) field and a logic circuit (ASIC or FPGA). In this direction, a sign-off power analysis and a voltage (IR) drop analysis can be useful to localize possible circuit weaknesses and identify the most vulnerable regions to EMP attacks. The preliminary results of a sign-off power analysis conducted on a real circuit are provided and discussed. The long-term objective is the development of a model able to predict the effects of an EMP on a cryptosystem.

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“…Many information mentioned in this section refer to Dehbaoui et al(2012) and Poucheret et al (2011).…”

Section: Em Cartographymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Sign-off Power Analysis On a Cryptographic Circuit 31 Devimentioning

confidence: 99%

Forecasting the Effects of Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Embedded Cryptosystems

Alberto

Maistri

Leveugle

2013

Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective

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show abstract

“…In [2], the authors have shown that with high frequency (1GHz) harmonic injection, it was possible to inject, locally into the chip, enough power into the power ground network to take control of an internal clock generator designed in 90nm. Additionally they have shown that the increase (up to 50%) of the frequency, Δf, of the internally generated clock signal was following the average supply voltage increase, ΔV, observed in presence of harmonic injection.…”

Section: A Ring Oscillatorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electromagnetic analysis and fault injection onto secure circuits

Maistri

Leveugle

Bossuet

et al. 2014

2014 22nd International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC)

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International audienceImplementation attacks are a major threat to hardware cryptographic implementations. These attacks exploit the correlation existing between the computed data and variables such as computation time, consumed power, and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Recently, the EM channel has been proven as an effective passive and active attack technique against secure implementations. In this paper, we resume the recent results obtained on this subject, with a particular focus on EM as a fault injection tool

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“…Their ability to propagate through different materials is the most interesting one since it allows an attacker (without any preliminary preparation of the chip) to induce a very short glitch in the power supply voltage. This short glitch in the power supply voltage is the result of a coupling mechanism between the coil antenna and the targeted chip's Power Ground Network (pgn) [14,9].…”

Section: Electromagnetic Glitch Injection Techniquementioning

confidence: 99%

Electromagnetic Glitch on the AES Round Counter

Dehbaoui

Mirbaha

Moro

et al. 2013

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. This article presents a Round Addition Analysis on a software implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (aes) algorithm. The round keys are computed on-the-fly during each encryption. A non-invasive transient fault injection is achieved on the aes round counter. The attack is performed by injecting a very short electromagnetic glitch on a 32-bit microcontroller based on the arm Cortex-M3 processor. Using this experimental setup, we are able to disrupt the round counter increment at the end of the penultimate round and execute one additional round. This faulty execution enables us to recover the encryption key with only two pairs of corresponding correct and faulty ciphertexts.

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Local and Direct EM Injection of Power Into CMOS Integrated Circuits

Cited by 37 publications

References 4 publications

Forecasting the Effects of Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Embedded Cryptosystems

Forecasting the Effects of Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Embedded Cryptosystems

Electromagnetic analysis and fault injection onto secure circuits

Electromagnetic Glitch on the AES Round Counter

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