Local elites,prokuratorsand extraction in rural Uzbekistan

Local Government Capacity in Post-Soviet Central Asia

“…In spite of these strategies, regional elites and networks find various ways to bend the centrally designed policies and laws. The most pertinent literature in this respect is the case study of rent-seeking strategies among local public prosecutors in Samarkand region by Markowitz [67] in which the author illustrates how an attempt to extend state power to the regional arenas unintentionally enhanced the control of local elites over extractive processes. Ilkhamov [45] describes the conflicting economic and political interests between central government, local producers and regional elites with respect to agricultural policy.…”

"Clanes" en Tayikistán: Hacia una perspectiva antropológica

“…La m a y o r í a d e l o s t e m a s e c o n ó m i c o s s e r e f i e r e n a t r a n s f o r m a c i o n e s t a l e s c o m o l a s r e f o r m a s a g r a r i a s ( Z h u k o v 2 0 0 5 ) , p r i v a t i z a c i o n e s , " t r a n s i c i ó n " a l a e c o n o m í a d e mercado (Uyanik & Segni 2001;Volgina, Gafarly & Semenova 2001;Trushin & Trushin 2002;Zhukov 2002), y crisis y ayuda internacional. Recientemente se ha enfatizado el impacto de lo "local" en las prácticas políticas que perpetúan la continuidad de las formas nativas de producción, explotación y corrupción contextualizadas en variadas relaciones de poder (Wegerich 2006;Trevisani 2007;Ilkhamov 2007;Markowitz 2008). Con los nuevos acuerdos internacionales sobre la explotación y comercialización de petróleo y gas natural, particularmente en Kazajastán y Turkmenistán, la geopolítica y la seguridad regional se han convertido en una zona teórica, así como las relaciones internacionales de países de Asia Central con el mundo (Jonson & Allison, 2 0 0 1 ; Z v i a g e l ' s k a i a , 2 0 0 5 ; O l c o t t 2 0 0 5 ; R u m e r 2 0 0 7 ) .…”

Living law, legal pluralism, and corruption in post-Soviet Uzbekistan

“…(2) As seen in the traffic policeman's case, the midwife's story indicates that kleptocratic practices of high-level state officials (elites) should be distinguished from the informal practices of ordinary citizens and low-level officials that have a different meaning ('to get things done'). Hence, the midwife's informal practices significantly differ from the predatory practices of kleptocratic elites, such as 'the rent-seeking strategies among local prokurators (prosecutors) in Uzbekistan' (Markowitz 2008) or the 'battle for cotton' between the central government and regional elites in Uzbekistan (Ilkhamov 2004). In this regard, the rent-seeking strategy of local prokurators is not comparable to the suyunchi midwives and nurses receive from ordinary citizens.…”

“…Anthropological studies have demonstrated the existence of local perceptions of moral codes and values of informal transactions that significantly differ from Western morality and standards (Abramson 2000;Werner 2000;Kurkchiyan 2000;Humphrey 2002Humphrey , 2012Wanner 2005;Sneath 2006;Markowitz 2008;Polese 2008;Ledeneva 2009;Rasanayagam 2011;Urinboyev 2011b;Urinboyev and Svensson 2013). This literature is based upon a theoretical understanding of money, gifts, and the morality of exchange (Mauss 1924;Parry and Bloch 1989;Thomas 1991), as well as empirical studies concerned with different kinds of transactions between citizens and state officials.…”

“…Also, much of the scholarly literature, especially anthropological accounts, demonstrates that the laws and symbols of the state are virtually absent in everyday life, while 'informality' is quite an omnipresent phenomenon in both 'state' and 'non-state' arenas (e.g. Wegerich 2006;Ilkhamov 2007;Kandiyoti 2007;Trevisani 2007;Markowitz 2008;Rasanayagam 2011). The anecdote thus begs questions of whether there is a 'living law' in Uzbekistan, and if so, how it works, how it is interpreted by the local population, and what implications it has for understanding corruption in the local context.…”