Local Politics, Political Institutions, and Public Resource Allocation

Palaniswamy, Nethra; Krishnan, Nandini

doi:10.1086/664020

Cited by 16 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Deep inequities persist along caste and tribal lines in rural India. According to previous research, council presidents do exert an important influence over the selection of beneficiaries of government welfare schemes (e.g., Besley et al 2004;Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004;Palaniswamy and Krishnan 2008), and our evidence is consistent with this claim. 4 Widespread inequalities also persist along gender lines.…”

Section: Distributive and Policy Effects Of Quotassupporting

confidence: 90%

“…Several previous studies do find evidence that caste-based quotas shape distributive outcomes in several Indian states. Palaniswamy and Krishnan (2008) find that, notwithstanding reservation, benefits flow within councils to the villages of dominant castes. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) concentrate on the impact of reservation for women (see also Beaman et al 2008), yet find some effects of SC/ST reservation on the allocation of spending across villages, though not on the composition of that funding; Bardhan et al (2005Bardhan et al ( , 2010, however, find that SC/ST reservation in West Bengal improves the flow of credit to SC/ST citizens, although it appears to worsen employment opportunities (and they find no impact of female reservation on public goods provision; see also Ban and Rao 2008).…”

Section: Distributive and Policy Effects Of Quotasmentioning

confidence: 82%

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Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils

2013

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E thnic quotas are often expected to induce distribution of material benefits to members of disadvantaged groups. Yet, the presence of an ethnic quota does not imply that political mobilization takes place along ethnic lines: Cross-cutting affiliations within multi-ethnic party organizations may lessen the tendency of politicians to target benefits to particular ethnic groups. In this article, we evaluate the impact of quotas for the presidencies of village councils in India, a subject of considerable recent research. Drawing on fine-grained information from surveys of voters, council members, presidents, and bureaucrats and using a natural experiment to isolate the effects of quotas in the states of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Bihar, we find weak distributive effects of quotas for marginalized castes and tribes, but suggestive evidence of the importance of partisanship. We then use survey experiments to compare the influence of party and caste on voting preferences and expectations of benefit receipt. Our results suggest that especially when politicians have dynamic political incentives to allocate benefits along party lines, cross-cutting partisan ties can blunt the distributive impact of ethnic quotas.

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Section: Distributive and Policy Effects Of Quotassupporting

confidence: 90%

Section: Distributive and Policy Effects Of Quotasmentioning

confidence: 82%

Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils

2013

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“…Other states such as Karnataka with high norms of civic participation and a high degree of devolution to panchayats but higher levels of social and economic inequality than Kerala exhibit forms of capture by dominant caste groups with respect to inter-village allocation of panchayat funds, with lower allocation to villages with high SC/ST populations (Palaniswamy and Krishnan, 2008). A similar pattern of discrimination against SC/ST groups in West Bengal is found by .…”

Section: Accountability Ofsupporting

confidence: 52%

Accountability of local and state governments in India: an overview of recent research

Mookherjee

2014

Indian Growth and Development Review

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Purpose-This paper aims to provide an overview of recent research on accountability of local and state governments in India. Design/methodology/approach-The Downsian theory of electoral competition is used as a departure point for classifying different sources of government accountability failures. Subsequent sections deal with each of these sources in turn: limited voter participation and awareness; ideology, honesty and competence of political parties and electoral candidates; capture by elites; clientelism and vote-buying. Each section starts by explaining the relevant departure from the Downsian framework and then reviews available empirical evidence in the Indian context for each of these possible "distortions", besides effects of related policy interventions. The final section summarizes the lessons learnt, and the fresh questions that they raise. Findings-The paper describes a range of possible reasons that limit the effectiveness of elections as a mechanism inducing governments to be accountable to their citizens and reviews the evidence available from the Indian context concerning each of these. Originality/value-The contribution of the paper is to provide an overview and perspective of recent literature on political economy problems affecting performance of state and local governments in India.

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“…Under this hypothesis, therefore, minority groups not targeted by the quota should also benefit from improved program implementation. Some evidence from India is consistent with this prediction: SC reserved councilors increase village expenditures in a manner that benefits both SC and ST in their village (Palaniswamy and Krishnan 2012).…”

Section: Intensive Margin (Distribution Of the Pie)mentioning

confidence: 71%

Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India’s Scheduled Areas

2020

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Does political affirmative action undermine or promote development? We present the first systematic analysis of Scheduled Areas in India, home to 100 million citizens, where local political office is reserved for the historically disadvantaged Scheduled Tribes. A newly constructed dataset of 217,000 villages allows us to probe conflicting hypotheses on the implementation of the world’s largest workfare program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. We find that reservations deliver no worse overall outcomes, that there are large gains for targeted minorities, and that these gains come at the cost of the relatively privileged, not other minorities. We also find improvements in other pro-poor programs, including a rural roads program and general public goods. Reservations more closely align benefits to each group’s population share, allaying concerns of overcompensation for inequalities. Contrary to the expectations of skeptics, results indicate that affirmative action can redistribute both political and economic power without hindering overall development.

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Local Politics, Political Institutions, and Public Resource Allocation

Cited by 16 publications

References 4 publications

Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils

Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils

Accountability of local and state governments in India: an overview of recent research

Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India’s Scheduled Areas

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