Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms

Podder, Shirsendu; Righi, Simone; Takács, Károly

doi:10.1038/s41598-021-95130-3

Cited by 13 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…Adopting a loose definition, reputation emerges when an individual's actions can be directly or indirectly observed by his peers and used to condition their own behaviours when playing with him. In both well-mixed [35,36] and structured populations [37,38], simple reputational systems promote and stabilize cooperation. Reputational systems at different levels of complexity have been studied, ranging from the first-order image scoring norm [39], to the second-order standing criterion [40,41] and to the more complex third-order leading eight social norms [42,43] or higherorder norms [44].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game

Podder

Righi

Pancotto

2021

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public goods game. The introduction of the ‘Loner’ strategy' allows players to withdraw from the game, which leads to a cooperator–defector–loner cycle. While pro-social punishment can help increase cooperation, anti-social punishment—where defectors punish cooperators—causes its downfall in both experimental and theoretical studies. In this paper, we introduce social norms that allow agents to condition their behaviour to the reputation of their peers. We benchmark this with respect both to the standard optional public goods game and to the variant where all types of punishment are allowed. We find that a social norm imposing a more moderate reputational penalty for opting out than for defecting increases cooperation. When, besides reputation, punishment is also possible, the two mechanisms work synergically under all social norms that do not assign to loners a strictly worse reputation than to defectors. Under this latter set-up, the high levels of cooperation are sustained by conditional strategies, which largely reduce the use of pro-social punishment and almost completely eliminate anti-social punishment. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game

Podder

Righi

Pancotto

2021

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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“…Reputation, however, is not necessarily available publicly or shared universally [57][58][59][60][61][62]. While individuals may observe the actions of others, reputational information in humans is often also transmitted through gossip [63][64][65][66].…”

Section: Reputation As a Mechanism For Solving The Problem Of Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

Takács

Gross

Testori

et al. 2021

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

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“…Third, real people interact mainly with neighbors or friends. Such biased interactions are often modeled by introducing lattices or complex networks [45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56] . Our study can be applied to the analysis of reputation structure even for such extended situations in the future.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment

Fujimoto¹,

Ohtsuki²

2022

Preprint

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Evaluation relationships are pivotal for maintaining a cooperative society. A formation of the evaluation relationships has been discussed in terms of indirect reciprocity, by modeling dynamics of good or bad reputations among individuals. Recently, a situation that individuals independently evaluate others with errors (i.e., noisy and private reputation) is considered, where the reputation structure (from what proportion of individuals in the population each receives good reputations, defined as goodness here) becomes complex, and thus has been studied mainly with numerical simulations. The present study gives a theoretical analysis of such complex reputation structure. We formulate a stochastic transition of goodness of individuals. By considering a large population, we derive dynamics of the frequency distribution of goodnesses. An equilibrium state of the dynamics is approximated by a summation of Gaussian functions. We demonstrate that the theoretical solution well fits the numerical calculation. From the theoretical solution, we obtain a new interpretation of the complex reputation structure. This study provides a novel mathematical basis for cutting-edge studies on indirect reciprocity.

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Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms

Cited by 13 publications

References 53 publications

Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game

Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game

Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment

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