Localizing Pain Matrix and Theory of Mind networks with both verbal and non-verbal stimuli

Abstract

Functional localizer tasks allow researchers to identify brain regions in each individual's brain, using a combination of anatomical and functional constraints. In this study we compare three social cognitive localizer tasks, designed to efficiently identify regions in the “Pain Matrix”, recruited in response to a person's physical pain, and the “Theory of Mind network”, recruited in response to a person's mental states (i.e. beliefs and emotions). Participants performed three tasks: first, the verbal false-belief stories task; second, a verbal task including stories describing physical pain versus emotional suffering; and third, passively viewing a nonverbal animated movie, which included segments depicting physical pain, and beliefs and emotions. All three localizers were efficient in identifying replicable, stable networks in individual subjects. The consistency across tasks makes all three tasks viable localizers. Nevertheless, there were small reliable differences in the location of the regions and the pattern of activity within regions, hinting at more specific representations. The new localizers go beyond those currently available: first, they simultaneously identify two functional networks with no additional scan time, and second, the non-verbal task extends the populations in whom functional localizers can be applied. These localizers will be made publicly available.

Parallel Distributed Networks Dissociate Episodic and Social Functions Within the Individual

“…These tasks were contrasted with a common control condition (PRESENT SELF). The ToM tasks involved representing others' mental states, either through making inferences about another person's beliefs (FALSE BELIEF) or considering another person's emotional pain or suffering (EMO PAIN;Dodell-Feder et al 2011;Jacoby et al 2016;Saxe and Kanwisher 2003); each was contrasted to its own matched control condition (FALSE PHOTO or PHYS PAIN). Example stimuli are provided in Table 1.…”

“…Theory of Mind Tasks. ToM tasks and their control conditions extended from the False Belief and the Emotional/Physical Pain Stories paradigms (Dodell-Feder et al 2011;Jacoby et al 2016;Saxe and Kanwisher 2003), each of which targets representation of others' mental states (e.g., Saxe 2006). These task contrasts were chosen because they show convergent patterns of activation that preferentially align with regions suggestive of Network B, in particular robust activation of the TPJ (Jacoby et al 2016).…”

From automata to animate beings: the scope and limits of attributing socialness to artificial agents

“…While these findings complement previously discussed findings of the role of the PPN, it is important to note that perception of social animations also engages brain activity beyond this network. For example, the goal‐directed movement of simple shapes triggers activation in the anterior intraparietal sulcus, part of the AON, similar to human goal‐directed movements, and social animations can be used to functionally localize the ToM network and robustly activate the TPJ …”

Social touch observation in adults with autism: intact neural representations of affective meaning but lack of embodied resonance

“…We included the same ROIs as in our previous study [19]: Brodmann area (BA) 3, BA1, BA2, Parietal Operculum (PO), Insula, Middle Cingulate Cortex (MCC), Middle Temporal Gyrus (MTG), Superior Temporal Gyrus (STG), TPJ, Precuneus, BA17, BA18, BA19, BA37, V5, and BA4. All these ROIs are known to be involved in the processing of visually presented social touch scenes: vicarious touch processing in the somatosensory network (BA3, BA1, BA2, and PO, [67]), the pain network (insula and MCC, [68]), the social-cognitive network (MTG, STG, TPJ, and Precuneus, [11]), and the visual network (BA17, BA18, BA19, BA37, and V5, [69]).…”

“…emotions, intentions, and beliefs) by means of meta-perspective reasoning [7]- [9]. This ToM system has been depicted as a relatively effortfull, controlled and cognitively demanding form of social cognition [10], implicating the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ) [11], [12]. The second account originates from the embodied simulation literature and aligns with the mirror neuron mechanism theory, and posits that individuals implicitly infer other people's emotional states from social cues by automatically re-enacting pre-acquired sensory experiences [13], [14].…”