Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy

Abstract

The Lockean Thesis says you must believe p iff you're sufficiently confident of it. On some versions, the 'must' asserts a metaphysical connection; on others, it asserts a normative one. On some versions, 'sufficiently confident' refers to a fixed threshold of credence; on others, it varies with proposition and context. Claim: in one of these forms or another, the Lockean Thesis follows from epistemic utility theory-the view that norms of rationality are constrained by the norm to promote accuracy. More: epistemic utility theory meshes with natural language considerations to yield a Lockean picture of beliefs that helps to model and explain their role in inquiry and conversation. Your beliefs are your best guesses in response to the contextual priorities you face. In this respect epistemic utility theory and natural language are jointly illuminating: each can be used to study the other. Upshot: we have a new approach to the epistemology and semantics of belief. And it has teeth. It implies that the role of beliefs is fundamentally different than many have thought, and in fact supports a metaphysical reduction of belief to credence. Question. You ask me if I think Bob's in his office, and I reply that I'm confident he is. Have I answered your question? Have I told you what I think? Some theorists say "No": there's a further attitude that I might take-belief-and telling you that I have high credence doesn't settle the question of whether I believe. 1 The Lockean Thesis disagrees: I must believe he's in his office iff I'm sufficiently confident he is. 2 But that claim is multiply ambiguous. (1) The 'must' could assert either a metaphysical or a normative connection: perhaps belief reduces to high credence; or perhaps they are distinct attitudes which simply ought to be in harmony. (2) The 'sufficiently confident' could refer to either a fixed or variable threshold of credence: perhaps there is a single threshold such that I believe iff my credence is above that threshold; or perhaps the threshold can vary with proposition and context. Mix and match these distinctions as you like-they are all versions of the Lockean Thesis as I will understand it. Method. You ask me if you should be more confident that Linda is a bank teller than

Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain

“…Combining this observation with the fact that natural language expresses conditional probabilities as probabilities of (indicative) conditionals (cf. Stalnaker 1970;Adams 1975;Edgington 1995) And if Lockeans are right that belief reduces to sufficiently high credence (Foley 1992(Foley , 2009Sturgeon 2008;Leitgeb 2013;Dorst 2017):…”

What it takes to believe

“…2, even a weak belief attribution can give rise to strong readings. 35 Dorst (2019), for example, explicitly treats the views as opposed.…”

Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

“…The first claim is generally understood as a commitment to monism about fundamental epistemic value and to truth as the sole epistemic value. 1 We do well to distinguish clearly EUT from veritism. Although the vast majority of the discussions of EUT concern the conjunction of the two views, neither one entails the other.…”