Logic, probability, and human reasoning

Johnson‐Laird, P. N.; Khemlani, Sangeet; Goodwin, Geoffrey P.

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.02.006

Cited by 200 publications

(193 citation statements)

References 135 publications

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“…The first one explains the four problems pointed out by Johnson-Laird et al (2015) and mentioned between brackets by me above. On the other hand, the remaining four address in turn each of those four difficulties and show the arguments that can be offered to solve them.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…The first problem indicated by Johnson-Laird et al (2015) is that of monotonicity. Certainly, standard logical systems and the syntactic theories directly or indirectly based on them tend to be monotonic, and this is a concern because human thought does not seem to be so.…”

Section: Four Problems For the Syntactic Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, the paper authored by Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, and Goodwin (2015) seems to question the primary ideas underlying these theories. Indeed, they provide four reasons why frameworks of this kind cannot continue to be accepted (as also explained below, such reasons are that they cannot capture the everyday nonmonotonic inferences, that they usually understand the conditional as material, that they allow vapid inferences, and that they do not usually propose methods to identify the real logical forms of the sentences).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Essentially Syntactic and Formal Theory Is Still Possible

Astorga

2017

Pragmalinguistica

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ABSTRACT:In 2015, JohnsonLaird, Khemlani, and Goodwin indicated four reasons why a basically syntactic approach explaining the human inferential activity is hard to accept nowadays. However, in this paper, I try to show that such reasons do not reveal real problems for the syntactic frameworks, and that most of the difficulties related to them have already been addressed by the literature on cognitive science and considered to be clearly surmountable from a mainly formal perspective. In this way, I argue that it is still possible to claim that syntax plays an important role in human thought. RESUMEN:En 2015, JohnsonLaird, Khemlani y Goodwin plantearon cuatro razones por las que, en nuestros días, es complejo aceptar un enfoque básicamente sintáctico para explicar la actividad inferencial humana. No obstante, en este trabajo, intento mostrar que tales razones no revelan problemas reales en los marcos sintácticos y que la mayoría de las dificultades relacionadas con ellas ya han sido analizadas en la literatura de la ciencia cognitiva y consideradas como claramente superables desde una perspectiva principalmente formal. De este modo, argumento que todavía es posible defender que la sintaxis desempeña un rol importante en el pensamiento humano. RÉSUMÉ:En 2015, JohnsonLaird, Khemlani et Goodwin ont indiqué quatre raisons pour les quelles une approche essentiellement syntaxique expliquant l'activité inférentielle humaine est difficile à accepter de nos jours. Cependant, dans cet article, j'essaie de montrer que de telles raisons ne révèlent pas de problèmes réels pour les cadres syntaxiques et que la plupart des difficultés qui les concernent ont déjà été abordées dans la littérature sur les sciences cognitives et considérées comme clairement surmontables à partir d'une perspective essentiellement formelle. De cette façon, je soutiens qu'il est encore possible de prétendre que la syntaxe joue un rôle important dans la pensée humaine.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Four Problems For the Syntactic Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Essentially Syntactic and Formal Theory Is Still Possible

Astorga

2017

Pragmalinguistica

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“…Johnson-Laird 2006;2010;20122015Johnson-Laird and Byrne 2002;Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, and Goodwin 2015;Khemlani, Orenes, and Johnson-Laird 2014). This does not necessarily mean that I will assume all of the general theses of that theory in this paper.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pseudo-conditionals and causal assertibles in Stoic logic

López‐Astorga

2017

Principia

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Abstract. The Stoics not only analyzed sentences showing to be clear conditionals. They also reviewed other kinds of sentences related to the conditional that are not exactly conditionals, for example, the pseudo-conditionals and the causal assertibles. In this paper, I try to argue that the Stoic account of such sentences reveals that certain problems that contemporary cognitive science is concerned with, such as the ways the different relationships between clauses in a sentence can be expressed or the pragmatic phenomenon of the conditional perfection, were already considered by the Stoics, and that they even did deep studies of those problems. To do that, I resort to the semantic analysis of models usually made by the mental models theory, and use it as a methodological tool.

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“…This in turn leads us to think that maybe a semantic framework such as that of the mental models theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2006, 2012, 2015Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015;Khemlani, Lotstein, Trafton, & Johnson-Laird, 2015;Khemlani, Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 2012, 2014 can be a better alternative to explain the real way the human mind works, irrespective of the language spoken by the particular individuals.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Problems of the Mental Logic with the Double Negation: The Necessity of a Semantic Approach

López‐Astorga

2016

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

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Abstract. The double negation has always been considered by the logical systems from ancient times to the present. In fact, that is an issue that the current syntactic theories studying human reasoning, for example, the mental logic theory, address today. However, in this paper, I claim that, in the case of some languages such as Spanish, the double negation causes problems for the cognitive theories mainly based on formal schemata and supporting the idea of a universal syntax of thought in the human mind. Thus, I propose that, given those problems, semantic frameworks such as that of the mental models theory seem to be more appropriate for explaining the human inferential activity.

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Logic, probability, and human reasoning

Cited by 200 publications

References 135 publications

An Essentially Syntactic and Formal Theory Is Still Possible

An Essentially Syntactic and Formal Theory Is Still Possible

Pseudo-conditionals and causal assertibles in Stoic logic

The Problems of the Mental Logic with the Double Negation: The Necessity of a Semantic Approach

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