Logical Dialogues with Explicit Preference Profiles and Strategy Selection

Abstract

The Barth-Krabbe-Hintikka-Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe (From axiom to dialogue: a philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1982) and Hintikka and Hintikka (The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes. In: Eco U, Sebeok TA (eds) Sherlock Holmes confronts modern logic: Toward a theory of information-seeking through questioning. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), is the problem of characterizing the strategic reasoning of the players of dialogical logic and game-theoretic semantics games from rational preferences rather than rules. We solve the problem by providing a set of preferences for players with bounded rationality and specifying strategic inferences from those preferences, for a variant of logical dialogues. This solution is generalized to both game-theoretic semantics and orthodox dialogical logic (classical and intuitionistic).

The brain attics: the strategic role of memory in single and multi-agent inquiry

“…3 In order to make the notion of strategy formally precise, M. B. and J. Hintikka specified a utility function for an Inquirer with bounded cognitive resources [working memory (Hintikka and Hintikka 1983) and attention (Hintikka and Hintikka 1989)] and a subsequent preference for lower cognitive loads. Unfortunately, those utilities cannot in general support strategic reasoning without hypercomputation, that is, solving problems that are not computable by Turing machines [formal arguments are presented in Genot (2017), Genot and Jacot (2017)]. After the death of M. B. Hintikka, J. Hintikka and his collaborators sidestepped the issue, and bumped off utilities.…”