Logical omniscience at the laboratory

Abstract

Homo Strategicus populates the vast plains of Game Theory. He knows all logical implications of his knowledge (logical omniscience) and chooses optimal strategies given his knowledge and beliefs (rationality). This paper investigates the extent to which the logical capabilities of Homo Sapiens Sapiens resemble those possessed by Homo Strategicus. Controlling for other-regarding preferences and beliefs about the rationality of others, we show, in the laboratory, that the ability of Homo Sapiens Sapiens to perform complex chains of iterative reasoning is much better than previously thought.Subjects were able to perform about two to three iterations of reasoning on average.

Cognitive Load and Mixed Strategies: On Brains and Minimax

“…However, do not …nd such a relationship. Similarly, we do not …nd a relationship in our data.7 Also seeMessick (1967),Fox (1972),Coricelli (2005), Levitt, List, and Reiley (2010),Shachat and Swarthout (2004, 2012),Spiliopoulos (2012Spiliopoulos ( , 2013,Shachat, Swarthout, and Wei (2015), andBayer and Renou (2016a).8 For instance, seeWagenaar (1972),Bar-Hillel, and Wagenaar (1991),Rapoport and Budescu (1992),Budescu and Rapoport (1994),Rabin (2002), andOskarsson et al (2009).…”

“…There is a large and growing literature that examines the relationship between measures of cognitive ability and strategic behavior. 9 We take a complimentary approach in that, rather 9 See Al-Ubaydli, Jones, and Weel (2016), Ballinger et al (2011), Baghestanian and Frey (2016), Bayer and Renou (2016a,2016b), Benito-Ostolaza, Hernández, and Sanchis-Llopis (2016), Brañas-Garza, Espinosa, and Rey-Biel (2011), Brañas-Garza, Garcia-Muñoz, and Hernan Gonzalez (2012, Brañas-Garza and Smith (2016), Burks et al (2009), Burnham et al (2009), Carpenter, Graham, andWolf (2013), Chen, Huang, and Wang (2013), Corgnet et al (2016), Coricelli and Nagel (2009), Devetag and Warglien (2003), Fehr and Huck (2015), Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2015), Gill and Prowse (2015), Grimm and Mengel (2012), Jones (2014), Jones (2008), Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, and Rosa-García (2016), Lohse (2016), Palacios-Huerta (2003b), Proto, than measure cognitive ability, we manipulate the available cognitive resources of the subject.…”

Learning from Forced Completion vs the Option to Opt Out: An Experiment on a Hybrid of the Game of 21 and the Centipede Game

“…All measures in these games are noisy since a player sometimes select the optimal choice by luck 2. The following studies are some of the studies which use an optimizing computer in their design: Cardella in G21, Johnson, Camerer, and Rymon 2002 in a bargaining game, Flannery and Roberts 2018 in a principalagent setting, Hoppe and Schmitz 2015 in an adverse selection environment, and Bayer and Renou 2016 in a game requiring iterated reasoning.…”