Love, Reasons, and Desire

Drake, Nicholas

doi:10.1007/s10677-020-10084-1

Cited by 11 publications

References 32 publications

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Morality: From Error to Fiction

Joyce

2024

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We make moral judgments about all sorts of things, both mundane and momentous. But are any of these moral judgments actually true? The moral error theorist argues that they are not. According to this view, when people make moral judgments (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong”), although they purport to say true things about the world, in fact the world does not contain any of the properties or relations that would be necessary to render such judgments true. Nothing is morally right; nothing is morally wrong. The first part of this book (“Morality in Error”) argues in favor of this version of moral skepticism. Moral properties, it is claimed, have features that cannot be accommodated within the naturalistic worldview. Some of these problematic features pertain to the “reason-giving” nature of moral properties; some pertain to puzzles surrounding the notion of moral responsibility. Suppose that we decided that this radical skepticism about morality is correct—what, then, should we do with our faulty moral discourse? The abolitionist presents the most obvious answer: that we should just do away with morality (in the way that in the past we eliminated talk of bodily humors, say). The fictionalist presents a less obvious answer: that we should retain moral discourse even though we know (at some level) that it is false. The second part of this book (“Morality as Fiction”) advocates an ambitious version of moral fictionalism. This book is a sequel to the author’s 2001 work The Myth of Morality.

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Morality: From Error to Fiction

Joyce

2024

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Preface

Joyce

2024

Morality: From Error to Fiction

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Mackie’s Arguments for Error Theory

Joyce

2024

Morality: From Error to Fiction

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Moral error theory is a form of skepticism about morality, according to which when people make moral judgments (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong”), although they purport to say true things about the world, in fact the world does not contain the properties or relations that would be necessary to render any of these judgments true. This chapter introduces this view and outlines the case offered in its support by J. L. Mackie in his well-known 1977 book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Mackie’s arguments for moral error theory include the Argument from Diversity, the Argument from Strangeness, and the Argument from Objectification. The chapter does not aim in particular to defend these arguments, but analyzes them in turn while emphasizing that they are intended to work in conjunction with each other, building a case for moral skepticism. Mackie’s attempt to establish error theory is shown, ultimately, to be inconclusive.

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Love, Reasons, and Desire

Cited by 11 publications

References 32 publications

Morality: From Error to Fiction

Morality: From Error to Fiction

Preface

Mackie’s Arguments for Error Theory

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