Loyal to the Executive: The Effect of State Capacity on Local Horizontal Accountability

Abstract

The literature suggests that state capacity has a reinforcing effect on democracy. According to this literature, the capacity and usability of the bureaucracy that state capacity entails are essential for the provision of goods and services that help to consolidate and improve democratic regimes. This paper challenges this proposition. It focuses on local democracy and draws on the comparative method to describe and evaluate how bureaucratic capacity and usability can affect a critical component of democracy-the horizontal (or intrastate) oversight on the executive. Contrasting with the literature, this paper argues that, even in democratic regimes, state capacity can discourage accountability agents that are elected through popular vote. As the results show, bureaucracies that are well funded, highly professionalized, and usable give local executives an ample capacity to discourage accountability agents (municipal councils) from holding them accountable. Local bureaucracies with these characteristics can isolate municipal councils from local communities, strip them from autonomous constituent support, and render council members electorally dependent on the mayor. When local bureaucracies lack these characteristics, executives can still manage to influence horizontal accountability by exchanging council members' support for access to municipal resources they can distribute to increase their constituent support. Municipal councils' inclination towards accountability is, however, greater when local bureaucracies are highly capable but not usable. In this case, the local executive lacks influence on council members' relationship with local communities and, therefore, on municipal councils' disposition to hold them accountable.

Do Fiscal Transfers Affect Local Democracy? Lessons from Chilean Municipalities

“…Additionally, mayors may use fiscal rents to engage in informal practices, such as patronage and clientelism. Regarding patronage, research has shown that mayors' discretion over public employment has led them to use municipal hiring as a strategy for voter mobilization and to build a support base (Corvalan et al 2018;Došek 2019;Ordóñez 2023). Although there are certain legal restrictions that limit public employment, these only establish the maximum percentages of the municipal revenues-which include the FCM-that can be spent to hire municipal bureaucrats.…”

“…For instance, Barozet (2008) shows that they offer employment and housing to boost their probability of success. Similarly, Pribble (2015) notes that mayors use the Municipal Labor Intermediation Office to claim credit for ensuring employment opportunities, whereas Ordóñez (2023) finds that mayors provide public resources to municipal councilors in exchange for loyalty, thereby undermining local horizontal accountability. Likewise, Došek's 2019 study of subnational democracy in Chile shows that less-than-democratic mayors build a strong support base mainly by delivering private goods to their constituents and local social organizations.…”