2008
DOI: 10.1080/17449050701847285
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Loyalist Paramilitary Violence after the Belfast Agreement

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Cited by 8 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The loyalist paramilitaries have used violence in pursuit of a variety of goals, both before and after the Good Friday Agreement. These goals were at times economic in the interest of their organised criminal activities and sometimes political in their opposition to the Republican paramilitaries, and their violence served social goals when used to establish and maintain social control within their communities and within their organisations (Steenkamp, 2008). But, it is their use of social violence as exemplified in their vigilante activities, which is the focus of this chapter.…”
Section: Vigilantism In Northern Irelandmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…The loyalist paramilitaries have used violence in pursuit of a variety of goals, both before and after the Good Friday Agreement. These goals were at times economic in the interest of their organised criminal activities and sometimes political in their opposition to the Republican paramilitaries, and their violence served social goals when used to establish and maintain social control within their communities and within their organisations (Steenkamp, 2008). But, it is their use of social violence as exemplified in their vigilante activities, which is the focus of this chapter.…”
Section: Vigilantism In Northern Irelandmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Despite these achievements and a reflexive insight into how they were seen, they lacked confidence and felt 'left behind' by Republicans, 'big house' Unionists and the British government. Loyalist guides lacked the critical mass and solidarity of the Republicans, and did not have the same level of focus (Mitchell, 2017), as indicated by the failure to successfully decommission (McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009), the ongoing feuds (Steenkamp, 2008), political isolation (Graham, 2004) and the lack of a voice (Hall, 2006).…”
Section: Politics and Propagandamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The continuing lower level of violence beyond 1998 is largely a result of spoiler activities of dissident groups who do not support the Agreement, feuding amongst Loyalist paramilitary groups and Loyalist contests over flag displays (Steenkamp, 2008).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%