Lulism, Populism, and Bonapartism

Abstract

Lulism is one of the most important political phenomena of twenty-first-century Brazil. It can be compared to the Varguism that dominated Brazilian politics between 1930 and 1964 in its broad popular but politically unorganized base and its policy of state intervention in the economy to stimulate economic growth, increase the state’s room for maneuver against the imperialist countries, and promote a moderate income distribution. These two variants of populism differ, however, in that Varguism was based on the working class while Lulism, which may be called “neopopulism,” is based on the marginal mass of workers and has less potential to destabilize the political process. Bonapartism, to which Lulism has also been compared, is distinct from it in that what links its leadership to its base is the fetish of the state based on order rather than the fetish based on protection. O lulismo é um dos fenômenos políticos mais importantes do Brasil do século XXI. Pode ser comparado ao varguismo que dominou a política brasileira entre 1930 e 1964 em relação à sua ampla, mas politicamente desorganizada, base popular, e sua política de intervenção estatal na economia para estimular o crescimento econômico, aumentar a margem de manobra do Estado contra os países imperialistas e promover uma distribuição de renda moderada. Essas duas variantes do populismo diferem, no entanto, no sentido de que o varguismo era baseado na classe trabalhadora, enquanto o lulismo, que pode ser chamado de “neopopulismo”, é baseado na massa marginal de trabalhadores e tem menos potencial para desestabilizar o processo político. O bonapartismo, ao qual o lulismo também foi comparado, é distinto dele, pois o que liga sua liderança à sua base é o fetiche do estado baseado na ordem, e não o fetiche baseado na proteção.

Post-neoliberalism and capital flow management in Latin America: assessing the role of social forces

“…This led to a deepening of the criticism against currency overvaluation and high-interest rates (CUT, FS and FIESP 2011). Even though this move did not signal a rupture with the macroeconomic tripod, industrial associations became closer to the government in the public debate, providing legitimacy to some interventionist measures (Boito 2020). On the other hand, domestic private banks kept their defense of macroeconomic orthodoxy, contending that abrupt policy changes could risk hard-won stability and have little effect on long-term economic challenges (Gallagher 2015a(Gallagher , 2015b.…”

“…Moving to the impact on interests, the new economic matrix favored manufacturers, who benefitted from lower taxes and interest rates, increased government-led demand, and mitigated currency overvaluation (Boito 2020). Workers also took advantage of expansionary macroeconomic policies, which led to low unemployment and improved social inclusion (Loureiro 2020).…”