Lying at the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface

Meibauer, Jörg

doi:10.1515/9781614510840

Cited by 80 publications

(74 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The analysis so far would have to lead us to tentatively accept the existence of ironic lies on the basis of the following syllogism: as shown above, one of the ironic implicatures always functions as the speaker's primary intended meaning (and bearer of truth-conditions according to the radical contextualist approach -see Jaszczolt 2009) -the speaker can then reasonably be taken to be committed to the truth of their main intended meaning (which, as shown in Kapogianni 2016, is always in the form of a declarative sentence), allowing for this to be considered a lie if the speaker simultaneously knows (and hides) that the main intended meaning is false (this syllogism then concurs with Dynel's commentary in her review of Meibauer 2014-Dynel 2015. However, it is the very fact that irony can be used to deceive (regardless of whether this is just a "deceit" and not a lie -or a deceptive implicature which is also a lie) that matters for the discussion of the ironist's covert intentions.…”

Section: Covert Intentionsmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…committing to the truth of a statement) is a precondition for lying then (a) can one lie via an (ironic) implicature or (b) can one still lie without asserting? Meibauer (2005Meibauer ( , 2014 accepts the possibility of "ironic lies", while Chisholm and Feehan (1977: 150) and Fallis (2009) among others, would not accept this possibility in view of irony not being an assertion and/or flouting instead of violating the Gricean maxim of Quality (the first sub-maxim, to be precise).…”

Section: Covert Intentionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The ironist’s intentions

Kapogianni

2016

P&C

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines the ironic speaker's intentions, drawing distinctions on the basis of two criteria: communicative priority (primary -secondary communicative intentions) and manifestness (overt -subtle -mixed -covert). It is argued that these provide useful insights into the widely discussed categories of speaker's intentions (e.g. a priori versus post facto intentions, private i-intentions versus shared we-intentions). First of all, "ironic meaning" is viewed as comprising a set of different types of meaning, including a bundle of implicatures that can be hierarchically ranked in terms of both communicative priority and inferential priority. Secondly, examples of different degrees of manifestness of the ironist's intentions are discussed in light of the communicative complexities of irony, which is viewed as a higherorder phenomenon. The final discussion attempts to bring together the analyses of the speaker's and the hearer's perspectives, contributing to a dynamic model of ironic discourse.

show abstract

Section: Covert Intentionsmentioning

confidence: 84%

Section: Covert Intentionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ironist’s intentions

Kapogianni

2016

P&C

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…white lies). In this vein, Meibauer (2014b) considers the topic of bald-faced lies, which are sometimes considered neither lies nor deception, in a technical sense (Dynel 2011b;Meibauer 2014a), but which may be viewed as acts of overt aggression.…”

Section: Notions Related To Impolitenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The landscape of impoliteness research

Dynel¹

2015

Journal of Politeness Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article attempts to give a state-of-the-art picture of impoliteness studies and to indicate a few prospective research directions to enrich them. It critically surveys a number of theoretical and methodological problems (impoliteness vs. rudeness; intention; sanctioned face-threat; and impoliteness strategies), as well as the paramount topics of investigation (such as disagreement; arguments; insults, taboo words; or sarcasm), and discourse domains in which impoliteness can be found. Importantly, this paper brings to focus a selection of notions central to impoliteness, albeit not yet widely recognized in the scholarship on impoliteness. These include: slurs; pejoratives; and a number of phenomena promoted by computer mediated communication (e.g., flaming or trolling).

show abstract

“…Leonard 1959, Falkenberg 1988, Meibauer 2014: this paper will take on the challenge, and extend the definition to other illocutionary acts. A theory of how the assertion-based definition applies to illocutionary acts other than assertion needs to show not only in which sense utterance like (1) and (2) satisfy the Ôassertion conditionÕ (i*), but also how the Ôinsincerity conditionÕ (ii) applies to them, as it is not clear under which conditions speech acts like warning or promising can be insincere.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Lying by Promising

Marsili

2016

Int Rev Pragmat

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as ÒI promise that ΦÓ can count as an assertion of its content Φ. Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a given illocutionary act can be insincere, and show how this applies to promises. I conclude that a promise to Φ is insincere (and consequently a lie) only if the speaker does not intend to Φ, or believes that he will not Φ, or both. In the second part, I test the proposed definition of lying by promising against the intuitions of ordinary language speakers. The results show that, unlike alternative accounts, the proposed definition makes the correct predictions in the cases tested. Furthermore, these results challenge the following necessary conditions for telling a lie with content p: that you have to assert p directly; that you have to believe that p be false; that p must be false; that you must aim to deceive the addressee into believing that p. In recent times, several philosophers have challenged this view, presenting some compelling counterexamples to the intention to deceive condition: lies under coercion (Siegler 1966:129, Carson 1988, lies to Ògo on the recordÓ, bald-faced lies (Carson 2 See Mannison (1969:132), Kupfer (1982:134), Simpson (1992), Williams (2002: 96), Faulkner (2007;, Meibauer (2005;. :17, Carson 2006:290, Sorensen 2007, Arico & Fallis 2013, and knowledge lies (Sorensen 2009). This has prompted many authors to drop (iii). 2However, rejecting (iii) comes at a price: a definition only featuring (i-ii) runs the risk of incorrectly ruling in fictional, ironical and metaphorical utterances. These are believed-false statements (i.e. they meet both condition (i) and (ii)), but are clearly not lies Condition (iii) correctly prevents the definition from counting these statements as lies. A putative alternative definition that rejects (iii) needs some alternative condition to play its role in ruling out these cases.A common way to respond to this challenge is to endorse an Ôassertion-basedÕ account of lying. The intuition behind this view is that the Ôstatement conditionÕ of the standard definition can be narrowed down, to require that the speaker genuinely assert the proposition that he believes to be false. Formally: An assertion-based definition can be further strengthened by requiring that also (iii) is satisfied, and some proponents of the intention to deceive condition endorse an assertion-based version of the standard view, in which both (iii) and (i*) 4 are required 3 Carson (2006; ), Sorensen (2007), Fallis (2009), Saul (2012), Stokke (2013. Except for Sorensen, all these authors spell out the assertion condition differently to (1*), specifying under which conditions a speakerÕs statement is a genuine assertion. 4 Chisholm a...

show abstract

Lying at the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface

Cited by 80 publications

References 0 publications

The ironist’s intentions

The ironist’s intentions

The landscape of impoliteness research

Lying by Promising

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About